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In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Voting 
Rights Act’s preclearance requirements for six states’ voting laws, and 
many of those states almost immediately enacted new voting restrictions, 
that disparately affected citizens of color. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Congress deregulated financial markets, including dismantling 
protections that had been in place since the New Deal, allowing firms to 
introduce new forms of derivatives—and systemic risk—into the economy, 
leading to 2008’s housing crisis. In the early 21st century, state 
legislatures increasingly enacted exemptions from state vaccination 
requirements that allowed parents to skip their children’s vaccinations, 
setting the stage for resurgences of measles in 2015 and 2019. Since at 
least 2001, courts, federal agencies, citizens, and NGOs have focused on 
the Clean Water Act’s alleged intrusions into state sovereignty and private 
property rights in the context of “dredge and fill” permits, undermining 
the Act’s continuing ability to improve the overall quality of the nation’s 
waterbodies.  
All of these seemingly unrelated legal phenomena derive, at least in 
part, from the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. 
In 1995, Dr. Daniel Pauly described the “shifting baseline syndrome” 
and its problems for fisheries management. Pauly posited that each 
 
*  Through June 30, 2021: James I. Farr Presidential Endowed Professor of Law & University 
Distinguished Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law, Salt Lake City, UT. From 
January 1 through June 30, 2021: Visiting Professor of Law, USC Gould School of Law, Los 
Angeles, CA. From July 1, 2021: Chaired Professor of Law, USC Gould School of Law, Los 
Angeles, CA. Research for this article received generous support from the Albert and Elaine 
Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I 
would like to thank my Utah Quinney Fellow Emma Tanner for her wide-ranging research in support 
of this article and the many faculty who provided helpful suggestions for this article throughout its 
development at the Law Faculty Works-in-Progress Workshop at the 2019 ABA Section on 
Environment, Energy, and Resources Annual Fall Conference; the Environmental, Natural 
Resources, and Energy Law Works-in-Progress session at the 2020 AALS Annual Meeting; the 
October 2020 Vermont Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship; the U.C. Davis School of Law 
Faculty Workshop in February 2021; Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law Faculty Workshop in March 
2021; the Spring 2021 Online Workshop for Environmental Scholarship in March 2021; and the 
USC Gould School of Law Faculty Workshop in March 2021. Nevertheless, all arguments in this 
article remain my responsibility. I may be reached at rcraig@law.usc.edu. 













 ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG Spring 2 
generation of fishers and fisheries managers forgets what the ocean and 
its fisheries used to be, instead taking the current state—demonstrably 
impoverished from a historical perspective—as normal. The forgetting of 
history, in other words, makes opaque what the goals of fisheries 
regulation should be, or even could be.  
This Article brings the shifting baseline concept into public law, 
identifying for the first time a regulatory shifting baseline syndrome that 
can undermine the law’s ability to protect society at large. This syndrome 
arises when a long-existing public legal regime so successfully eliminates 
a societal problem that citizens, politicians, and lawmakers forget that the 
regime is in fact still working to keep that problem at bay. The syndrome 
is especially problematic in areas of public law where curbing human 
behavioral tendencies remains an important component of protecting 
public goods, benefits, or amenities, regardless of how secure the relevant 
public commons now appears. Acknowledging the syndrome thus 
challenges would-be law reformers to ask whether we should recover the 
historical lessons about ourselves and our collective abilities to harm 
society at large before dismantling the legal protections prior generations 
felt compelled to enact.  
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And you, of tender years, 
Can’t know the fears, 
That your elders grew by. 
-- Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young, “Teach Your Children” 
 
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.  
Studying history is necessary to avoid repeating past mistakes. 





In June 2013, in Shelby County v. Holder, a five-Justice majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court rejected the historical underpinnings of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, holding unconstitutional the Act’s mandate that some states (and only some 
states) seek federal permission before enacting voting laws (“preclearance 
requirements”).1 According to the Court majority, times have changed: 
 
There is no denying . . . that the conditions that originally justified 
these measures no longer characterize voting in the covered 
jurisdictions. By 2009, “the racial gap in voter registration and 
turnout [was] lower in the States originally covered by § 5 than it 
[was] nationwide.” Since that time, Census Bureau data indicate that 
African–American voter turnout has come to exceed white voter 
turnout in five of the six States originally covered by § 5, with a gap 
in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent.2 
 
The issue for the Court was not whether voting discrimination still existed; the 
majority admitted that it did.3 Rather, “The question is whether the Act’s 
extraordinary measures, including its disparate treatment of the States, continue to 
satisfy constitutional requirements. As we put it a short time ago, ‘the Act imposes 
current burdens and must be justified by current needs.’”4 
The Shelby County Court had decided to tussle with the regulatory shifting 
baseline syndrome. The Justices’ split, moreover, underscores the importance of 
public regulatory regimes as cultural memory institutions. 
In 1995, Dr. Daniel Pauly described the “shifting baseline syndrome” and the 
 
1 Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556-57 (2013) (referencing Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
§§ 4, 5, formerly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b, 1973c, now 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303, 10304). 
2 Id. at 535 (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203–
204 (2009)). 
3 Id. at 536. 
4 Id. (quoting Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 203). 
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problems it causes for fisheries management.5 Pauly argued that each generation of 
fishers and fisheries managers forgets what the ocean and its fisheries used to 
sustain, instead taking the current abundance and size of desired fish—however 
demonstrably impoverished those might be from a historical perspective—as 
normal.6 As a result, fisheries management, laws, and policies never seek to restore 
fisheries and marine ecosystems to true health, but instead accept and adjust to 
progressively worsening ecological conditions.7 The forgetting of history, in other 
words, makes opaque what the goals of regulation should be, or even could be. In 
fisheries regulation and other forms of species and ecosystem management, 
therefore, reconstructing historical ecological conditions has become the means of 
correcting the shifting baseline syndrome.8  
This Article moves the shifting baseline syndrome into public law,9 arguing that 
successful regulatory regimes can actually cause a shifting baseline syndrome—the 
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. This syndrome arises when the laws created 
to correct a particular societal problem are so successful that, after some time 
passes, citizens, politicians, courts, administrative agencies, and legislatures forget 
that that regulatory regime is in fact still functioning. The syndrome thus distorts 
public estimation of the regime’s continuing existential value, potentially inducing 
courts, legislatures, and agencies to weaken, dismantle, or eliminate it.  
Given its society-wide function, public law ought to serve as a form of cultural 
memory or memory institution, a record of why a community has legally protected 
itself in the ways that it has. “Memory institutions are social entities that select, 
document, contextualize, preserve, index, and thus canonize elements of 
humanity’s culture, historical narratives, [and] individual[] and collective 
 
5 Daniel Pauly, Anecdotes and The Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Fisheries, 10 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY 
& EVOLUTION 430, 430 (1995). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 See discussion infra Part I. 
9 “Public law,” for purposes of this discussion, refers to the statutes, regulations, and policies that 
both regulate government itself and operate to protect society as a whole from problems that arise 
at scales too large to deal with effectively through private law mechanisms, such as contracting, 
insurance, or tort liability. Scholars generally distinguish “public law” from “private law” either on 
the basis that public law involves and regulates the government itself, see, e.g., David Sloss, 
Polymorphic Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law 
Litigation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1757, 1767-68 (2014); Ryan J. Cassidy, Prefatory Remarks: 
Administrative Law and the First Annual Survey, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 617, 621-22 (1996), or on 
the basis of the law’s subject matter. See, e.g., Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the “Public Law 
Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255, 261, 300-304 (1999) (noting 
that “private law and public law are defined according to the categories or types of law traditionally 
within each: private law traditionally includes contracts, torts, property, and family law, while public 
law traditionally includes antitrust, securities, exchange controls, and most economic regulation”). 
This Article embraces both inflections of “public law” but relies more heavily on the latter, 
extending McConnaughay’s emphasis on “public law's focus on the public interest and preventing 
public harm,” id. at 302, to public health law and environmental and natural resources law. 
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memories.”10 Traditional and paradigmatic memory institutions include archives, 
museums, and libraries; more contemporary additions include the various 
“networked memory institutions” of the internet and social media.11 However, 
statutes and regulatory regimes, together with the histories of their creation, are also 
memory institutions.12  
Unfortunately, the status of public legal regimes as memory institutions is 
underappreciated, particularly within the law itself.13 To be sure, examination of 
statutory purpose remains a bedrock touchstone of statutory interpretation, and 
courts continue to examine statutory history14 and even legislative history15 in the 
process. However, the process of statutory construction occurs within the regulatory 
regime itself and assumes that regime’s continued legitimacy. The cultural memory 
at issue in this Article, in contrast, operates at a higher scale, informing not (or not 
just) what the particular instruments (laws, regulations) mean but rather their 
continuing value to society. Indeed, the very existence of public laws on a particular 
subject should remind citizens, politicians, judges, and legislators that there was in 
fact a historical problem that might recur if the correcting regulatory regime does 
not remain in place.  
 
10 Guy Pessach, [Networked] Memory Institutions: Social Remembering, Privatization and Its 
Discontents, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 73 (2008) (citing ARCHIVES, DOCUMENTS AND 
INSTITUTIONS OF SOCIAL MEMORY: ESSAYS FROM THE SAWYER SEMINAR (Francis X. Blouin, Jr. & 
William G. Rosenberg eds., 2006); REPRESENTING THE NATION: A READER—HISTORIES, HERITAGE 
AND MUSEUMS (David Boswell & Jessica Evans eds., 1999). 
11 Id. 
12 Notably, the European Union is dealing with the opposite problem in the form of so-called 
“memory laws,” which seek to reify a particular interpretation or perspective on history. Thus, 
“‘Memory laws’ enshrine state-approved interpretations of crucial historical events and promote 
certain narratives about the past, by banning, for example, the propagation of totalitarian ideologies 
or criminalising expressions which deny, grossly minimize, approve, or justify acts constituting 
genocide or crimes against humanity, as defined by international law.” Council of Europe, ‘Memory 
Laws’ and Freedom of Expression 1 (July 2018), available at https://rm.coe.int/factsheet-on-
memory-laws-july2018-docx/16808c1690. However, the use of law to actively construct cultural 
memory, as Europe justly worries about, is a different enterprise than the one advocated in this 
Article: the recognition that statutes and regulations created to address public problems constitute 
contextually situated records of cultural memory. 
13 In contrast, historians often find the laws of earlier times valuable resources in reconstructing 
historical cultural norms or in establishing the bases of later reform and evolution. E.g., Michael M. 
Sheehan, Marriage Theory and Practice in the Conciliar Legislation and Diocensan Statutes of 
Medieval England, 40 MEDIEVAL STUDIES 408, 408-460 (1978). 
14 [Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory History (DRAFT 2021)] 
15 E.g., County of Maui, Haw., v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, --- U.S.---, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468-69, 1471-
72, 1476 (2020) (emphasizing Congress’s purposes in interpreting the Clean Water Act and 
including an examination of legislative history); Gundy v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2126 (2019) (noting that “beyond context and structure, the Court often looks to ‘history [and] 
purpose’ to divine the meaning of language” (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))); Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 
576 (2007) (relying on legislative history); McCreary County, Ky. v. American Civil Liberties 
Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 861-63 (2005) (discussing the importance of legislative purpose to 
statutory interpretation). 
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In the 21st century, acknowledging the cultural memory embedded in public 
law serves two different governance goals, particularly when those regulatory 
regimes have existed for a decade or longer. First, as a memory institution, the laws 
and regulations at issue are reminders of how their drafters understood the world 
and the problem at hand, allowing would-be reformers to assess whether those 
understandings remain objectively valid. As one contemporary example, I and 
others have argued extensively that the Anthropocene and the increasing impacts 
of climate change demand a re-evaluation and replacement of regulatory regimes 
that assume the stationarity of ecological and social-ecological systems,16 including 
new approaches to climate change adaptation.17 The regimes in need of significant 
amendment to acknowledge these evolved scientific understandings include most 
of the natural resources, public lands, and environmental statutes adopted 
throughout the 20th century.18 The crucial cultural memory embedded in these 
public laws is the Balance of Nature model of ecosystems prevalent in scientific 
discourse at the time Congress and state legislatures adopted them.19 Recovering 
that cultural memory illuminates the facts both that our understanding of how 
complex systems behave has changed significantly since the 1970s, undermining 
 
16 See generally, e.g., Karrigan Börk, Guest Species: Rethinking Our Approach to Biodiversity in 
the Anthropocene, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 169; MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE 
END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE (Kansas Univ. Press, 2017); Kalyani Robbins, The Biodiversity Paradigm Shift: 
Adapting the Endangered Species Act to Climate Change, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2015); 
Lance H. Gunderson, Ahjond Garmestani, Keith W. Rizzardi, J.B. Ruhl, & Alfred Light, Escaping 
a Rigidity Trap: Governance and Adaptive Capacity to Climate Change in the Everglades Social 
Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 127 (2014) ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, COMPARATIVE OCEAN 
GOVERNANCE: PLACE-BASED PROTECTIONS IN AN ERA OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Edward Elgar, 2012); 
Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws to a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change 
Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269 (2012); Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live 
Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9 
(2010); Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law 
under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. REGULATION 171 (2010); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation 
and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010); Robert L. 
Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate Change: An Adaptive 
Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833 (2009); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change 
and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2008). 
17 J.B. Ruhl & Robin Kundis Craig, 4°C (forthcoming 2022). 
18 Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How Program Goals 
and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 743-
806 (2016) (assessing the federal public lands statutes); CRAIG, supra note 16, at 47-65, 91-169 
(assessing current legal approaches to marine protected areas); Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 
31-40 (assessing pollution control and natural resources statutes); Camacho, Assisted Migration, 
supra note 16, at 188-210 (assessing species-related and public lands statutes); Ruhl, Structural 
Transformation, supra note 16, at 391-433 (assessing a broad swath of environmental and natural 
resources statutes). 
19 Melinda H. Benson, New Materialism: An Ontology for the Anthropocene, 59 NATURAL RES. J. 
251, 261 (2019); BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 16, at 31, 57, 165-66; Craig, Stationarity, supra note 
16, at 32. 
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these statutes’ regulatory premises,20 and that climate change is accelerating 
systemic change, undermining these statutes’ continuing abilities to function 
productively.21 In other words, acknowledging this first cultural memory function 
of law helps law- and policymakers to better evaluate when legal regimes do, in 
fact, need to change. 
This Article, however, explores the second governance function served by 
acknowledging that public law is a form of cultural memory: improved evaluation 
of whether apparently outdated legal regimes really should remain in place. 
Specifically, it posits that when legal regimes exist to curb human impulses and 
behaviors that have been demonstrated to cumulatively damage society as a whole, 
those regimes serve as important reminders that removal of existing restraints is 
likely to re-create old problems. Thus, even in the environmental context, an 
evolved understanding of system dynamics and climate change impacts does not 
change the fact that pollution control regimes—that is, restraints on historically 
demonstrated human tendencies to contaminate commons resources (air, rivers, 
lakes, land, the ocean) with toxics and other damaging pollutants—remain critical 
protectors of human health and environmental quality in the 21st century.22 Failure 
to heed these reminders, in contrast, allows the regulatory regime to fall victim to 
the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. 
Shelby County provides a significant example. Contrary to some 
characterizations,23 the Supreme Court majority did not forget its history. It 
acknowledged, for example, why Congress had singled out certain states for special 
treatment under the Voting Rights Act: “In the 1890s, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, began to 
enact literacy tests for voter registration and to employ other methods designed to 
prevent African-Americans from voting,” and as courts struck down these 
measures, “States came up with new ways to discriminate,” effectively preventing 
registration of black voters.24 Instead, the majority concluded that the Act’s 
distinctions among states based on historic practices had served their purposes—
specifically, that the states whose voting laws were still subject to federal approval 
had come into line with, or even improved upon, the rest of the country in terms of 
black voter registration.25 In the majority’s view, “things have changed 
dramatically.”26 The Act had done—emphasis on the past tense—its job,27 and the 
 
20 BENSON & CRAIG, supra note 16, at 56-70; Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 39-40; Camacho, 
Assisted Migration, supra note 16, at 179-88. 
21 Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 46-48; Camacho, Assisted Migration, supra note 16, at 188-
210; Ruhl, Structural Transformation, supra note 16, at 391-433; Glicksman, supra note 16, at 839-
51. 
22 Craig, Stationarity, supra note 16, at 45-46. 
23 E.g., Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History, 44 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 357, 357-59, 
385 (2013). 
24 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 536 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966)). 
25 Id. at 547-49. 
26 Id. at 547. 
27 Specifically, according to the Court: 
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objective regulatory baseline had, according to the majority, moved in 
constitutionally significant ways.28 Problem solved. 
In contrast, the dissenters (and, in their view, Congress) appreciated the fact 
that the Voter Rights Act’s preclearance requirements were still doing their job, 
“facilitat[ing] completion of the impressive gains thus far made” and, hinting at the 
human impulse problem, “guard[ing] against backsliding.”29 The aftermath of the 
decision supports their conclusion that the most important regulatory baseline at 
issue, a state impulse to discriminate. had not, in fact, moved significantly—that is, 
in the terms of this Article, that the majority Justices reached their constitutional 
 
 
Coverage today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices. The formula 
captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registration and turnout in the 
1960s and early 1970s. But such tests have been banned nationwide for over 40 years. And 
voter registration and turnout numbers in the covered States have risen dramatically in the 
years since. Racial disparity in those numbers was compelling evidence justifying the 
preclearance remedy and the coverage formula. There is no longer such a disparity. 
 
In 1965, the States could be divided into two groups: those with a recent history of voting 
tests and low voter registration and turnout, and those without those characteristics. 
Congress based its coverage formula on that distinction. Today the Nation is no longer 
divided along those lines, yet the Voting Rights Act continues to treat it as if it were. 
 
Id. at 551. See also K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political 
Economy in the New Gilded Age: Toward a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 
1335 (2016) (“The Court's dismantling of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County can be understood 
as an argument that underlying structural political inequalities that may have justified preclearance 
are no longer present, and thus ordinary political competition, like market competition, is sufficient 
to ensure freedom of choice and basic political equality.”). 
28 Other scholars have also explicitly characterized the Shelby County majority’s opinion as 
reflecting the Justice’s perception of an objectively shifted baseline. See Diane S. Sykes, 
Minimalism and Its Limits, 2015 CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 17, 32 (noting that “the Court had 
transparently signaled its discomfort with the coverage formula, which was based on a decades-old 
baseline that did not reflect changes in voting and discriminatory election practices when Congress 
reauthorized the Act in 2006.”). 
29 Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 559-60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As Joel Heller has more extensively 
described the survival of this impulse in areas still suffering from the burdensome memory of past 
discrimination: 
 
An awareness of the long history of voting discrimination on account of race in a 
jurisdiction may affect the attitudes of present-day policymakers towards race and the right 
to vote, and thus may influence the types of voting policies that they enact. One possibility 
is that local or state officials charged with setting voting policies and election procedures 
will ignore any burden that a policy has on minority voters as simply a natural or 
unavoidable phenomenon. Centuries of precedent exist for inequality in this area of civic 
life, and these policymakers know that their not-too-distant predecessors in office enacted 
and administered such policies with a large degree of indifference, or even support, in their 
communities. 
 
Heller, supra note 23, at 385-86. 
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conclusion based on the distorting effects of the regulatory shifting baseline 
syndrome. The Brennan Center for Justice notes that “[w]ithin 24 hours of the 
ruling, Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law. Two other 
states, Mississippi and Alabama, also began to enforce photo ID laws that had 
previously been barred because of federal preclearance.”30 In a 2018 report, the 
Center further concluded that “the Supreme Court’s 2013 Shelby County v. Holder 
ruling, which neutered the strongest legal protection against voting discrimination, 
changed the landscape. A flood of new barriers to voting that would have otherwise 
been blocked were implemented at once, and newly unfettered legislatures were 
incentivized to press forward with additional restrictions.”31 
Importantly, the need to invoke the cultural memory function of public laws 
varies by regulatory context. Long-existing regulatory regimes that seem equally 
incorporated into societal norms nevertheless differentially fall victim to 
generational amnesia regarding their continuing efficacy.  For example, despite 
their 80-year existence, the protections afforded children through child labor laws 
remain socially and politically salient. Until the early part of the 20th century, most 
children in working class families worked long hours, often under dangerous 
conditions, and from very young ages.32 Congress began to intervene as early as 
 
30 The Effects of Shelby County v. Holder, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby-county-v-holder. 
31 Wendy Weise & Max Feldman, Brennan Center for Justice, NYU School of Law, The State of 
Voting 2018, at 5 (2018) (emphasis added), available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_State_of_Voting_2018.pdf. The 
fact that, by 2018, a total of 23 states had enacted more restrictive voting laws that disparately 
impacted people of color and other vulnerable populations arguably suggests that federal 
preclearance requirements should apply to more states rather than none. See id. at 5-7; see also 
Franita Tolson, The Law of Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of Voting Rights 
and Judicial Regulation of the Political Thicket, 43 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 345, 350 (2016) (noting 
that “most states have used their power over voter qualifications, which is significantly broader in 
the wake of Shelby County, to sharply define and limit who can participate in elections. In the last 
few years alone, states have enacted dozens of laws that make it considerably harder to vote … .”).  
Notably, the Shelby County decision also shifted the burden of proving the discriminatory impacts 
of voting laws from the covered governments (who had to show nondiscrimination) to 
disenfranchised voters, and it effectively shielded municipal ordinances related to voting from much 
scrutiny at all. Sam Levine & Ankita Rao, In 2013 the supreme court gutted voting rights—how has 
it changed the US?, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2020, 13:14 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/jun/25/shelby-county-anniversary-voting-rights-act-consequences.  
32 Congressional Research Service, Child Labor in America: History, Policy, and Legislative Issues 
1 (as updated 2013), available at 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20131118_RL31501_008741c7351fd72ae2a262198ba9c0e4
4921a60a.pdf. See also Joanna Grisinger, Book Review, James D. Schmidt, Industrial Violence and 
the Legal Origins of Child Labor, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 649, 649-50 (2011) (“describing nineteenth-
century producerist ideology, which valued individuals as workers. For Appalachian working 
families, clear lines between childhood and adulthood were absent. Instead, children were brought 
into the workplace to perform tasks appropriate to their size and skill level, growing into their roles 
as workers as they became adults.”). 
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1906,33 culminating in the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938.34 As is 
true for many new regulatory regimes affecting business, employers initially 
resisted the restrictions on child labor, necessitating additional restrictions and 
improved enforcement.35 However, “since roughly the late 1980s, child labor in its 
various aspects has largely disappeared from the policy scene; the issue is often 
viewed as a remnant of an earlier period in American history.”36 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent normification of child labor prohibitions and 
restrictions, no group strongly advocates that these restrictions have become 
unnecessary. In the terms of this Article, successive generations of U.S. society 
have not forgotten that child labor restrictions continue to provide important 
protections to children. That memory remains accessible in part because evidence 
indicates that many employers still violate restrictions on child labor, especially 
with respect to adolescents and immigrant children.37 Moreover, advocates for 
children often view these public law protections of children as incomplete,38 with 
organizations like the American Federation of Teachers seeking to extend existing 
 
33 However, its early efforts were often unsuccessful. See, e.g., Constitutional Law—Federal Child 
Labor Law Invalid, 27 YALE L.J. 1092, 1092-93 (1918) (summarizing the then-recent Supreme 
Court decision). 
34 Congressional Research Service, supra note 32 at 2-5. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified 
as 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and the child labor prohibitions are found in Section 212. 
35 Congressional Research Service, supra note 32, at 5 (citation omitted).  
36 Id. at 1. 
37 Priyanka Boghani, Q&A:America’s “Invisible” Child Labor Problem, PBS FRONTLINE (April 24, 
2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/qa-americas-invisible-child-labor-problem/; 
Alana Semuels, How Common Is Child Labor in the U.S.?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/12/how-common-is-chid-labor-in-the-
us/383687/; Kimberly J. Rauscher, Carol W. Runyan, Michael D. Schulman, & J. Michael Bowling, 
US Child Labor Violations in the Retail and Service Industries: Findings From a National Survey 
of Working Adolescents, 98:9 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 1693, 1693-98 (2008), doi: 
10.2105/AJPH.2007.122853; Ana Maria Echiburu, Immigration Raid Results in Charges Filed 
Against Iowa Slaughterhouse for Child Labor Violations, 14 PUBLIC INTEREST L. REP. 93, 94 (2008) 
(“Child labor laws in Iowa prohibit children below the age of eighteen from working in a 
meatpacking plant. Employees in meat packing plants are exposed to dangerous machines and 
chemicals and often have to make thousands of cuts every day with sharp knives, risking lacerations, 
nerve damage, or muscle damage. The brutal environment of a meatpacking plant is not an 
appropriate place for children. Yet, the May 12 immigration raid of Agriprocessors in Iowa, 
uncovered underage employees working in such conditions, which is something Americans are 
unaccustomed to hearing about in the United States.”); Susan Makdisi, Student Essay, Child Labor, 
4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 281, 281 (1998) (“Imagine a place where children go to work on farms, in 
factories, on the streets, or in an industry, working five to sixteen hours a day, five to seven days a 
week. … This happens all over the world, including America and other developed countries.”). 
38 E.g., Meret Thali, Note, Missing Childhood: How Cultural Norms and Government Systems 
Continue to Support Child Labor in Agriculture, 20 DRAKE J. AGRICULTURAL L. 453, 454-55 (2015) 
(“This widespread general acceptance and promotion of children working in agriculture in the 
United States has led to federal legislation that has failed to protect these children, even though they 
are working in what is considered one of the three most dangerous sectors of labor.”). 
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restrictions to agriculture, which the Fair Labor Standards Act largely exempts.39 
Problem not, in other words, completely solved. 
As with the Voting Rights Act, however, the success of a public law regime can 
be so (apparently) complete that people come to believe that its restrictions are no 
longer necessary. Under the influence of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, 
the (apparent) disappearance of the problem transforms an initial cultural respect 
for the regulatory regime (it worked!) into a psychological resetting of the 
regulatory baseline—essentially, “we no longer have to worry about that problem 
and these laws are now an impediment to other things we want to do.” In particular, 
the disappearance of a specific problem can allow interest groups to re-frame the 
corrective regulatory regime as unnecessary, burdensome, expensive, or an 
infringement of private or states’ rights. In short, the perceived regulatory baseline 
shifts, inducing policymakers and legislators to view the existing legal regime as 
no longer necessary and perhaps even harmful, opening those legal protections to 
political re-evaluation, undermining, and perhaps even elimination. At the extreme, 
the political and policymaking systems wipe their cultural memory, countervailing 
pressures induce politicians and legislatures to dismantle or weaken the now-
devalued regimes—and history repeats itself. 
Applying a regulatory shifting baseline syndrome analysis to evolving and often 
contentious public debates therefore has the potential to reveal an important cultural 
component to the evolution of public law and policy: people, including politicians 
and legislators, forget the past, and this generational amnesia can change the 
contours of the relevant political and legal debate. This generational amnesia allows 
both government officials and the affected members of the public to question past 
regulatory decisions and past risk assessments in ways that would have been 
laughable two or three generations ago.  
This Article argues that identifying and resisting the regulatory shifting baseline 
syndrome offers one means of keeping needed public protections in place, avoiding 
the re-emergence of public commons problems that momentarily appear to have 
been “solved.” Specifically, awareness of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome 
should prompt a reframing of the status of the public problem under consideration 
from the objective manifestation (in Shelby County, racial disparities in voter 
registration) to the human impulses underlying that manifestation (in Shelby 
County, the impulse to discriminate). In so doing, the relevant questions for 
evaluating the regime’s continued existential value become not just Did it work? 
(racial disparities eliminated, at least momentarily) but also—and for purposes of 
avoiding the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, more importantly—What is 
likely to happen when the regime’s protections are removed? 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the shifting baseline 
syndrome in its original context, then transitions the psychology of fisheries 
regulation into the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. Part II examines the 2008 
 
39 Child Labor in the United States, AMER. FED. TEACHERS (as viewed January 23, 2021), 
https://www.aft.org/community/child-labor-united-states.  
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financial crisis as an example of this syndrome operating across multiple financial 
developments that nevertheless illustrate regulators’ repeated susceptibility to 
discounting the vulnerability of our economic system to systemic risk resulting 
from individual profit-seeking. In Parts III and IV, this Article re-frames two 
current public debates—the resistance to childhood vaccination and the convoluted 
debate over the breadth of “waters of the United States” under the federal Clean 
Water Act—as evidence of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in operation. 
Specifically, this Article argues that both controversies are inextricably bound up 
in cultural “forgettings” that are, paradoxically, the perverse result of the previous 
and highly successful laws and policies governing these two issues. Recapturing 
the cultural memories that those two regulatory regimes embody should thus be an 
important first step in both: (1) understanding the revaluations of those regimes 
currently in process; and (2) reminding the affected communities of why those 
regimes came to exist in the first place and their continuing roles in preventing the 
evils whose absence the general public and legislators now take for granted. 
Like the fisheries scientists who discovered the shifting baseline syndrome, this 
Article concludes that the re-animation of historical knowledge and cultural 
memory is an important corrective to the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. 
However, the emphasis here is different. In the ecological shifting baseline 
syndrome, historical reconstruction informs the creation of new regulatory goals. 
In the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, in contrast, accurate historical 
reconstruction and revival of cultural memory, with full appreciation of regulatory 
regimes as memory institutions, serves to prevent policymakers, legislatures, and 
courts from whittling away at seemingly outdated rules by reminding them that the 
rules are the reason that the societal evil has gone away—i.e., the regulatory regime 
worked, and, more importantly, is still working, to curb individual human behaviors 
that damage the greater public good. 
 
 
I. THE SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME IN FISHERIES AND OTHER ECOLOGICAL 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Humans forget things, both individually and in societal groups. Such forgettings 
can have significant consequences regarding when, how, and to what extent 
societies regulate to protect the general public good. In natural resource 
management, for example, one of the most well-studied and consequential 
phenomena resulting from this cultural amnesia has been the shifting baseline 
syndrome. First identified in marine fisheries management, the shifting baseline 
syndrome results from a society’s collective inability to accurately remember 
historical ecological conditions and compare them to existing conditions, skewing 
the focus and goals of natural resource management from what might be considered 
optimal. 
This Part explores the origins of the shifting baseline syndrome in natural 
resource management in order to highlight the solutions identified to counteract the 
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syndrome. Specifically, biologists and ecologists of all specialties have 
increasingly embraced the need to reconstruct historical states in order to recapture 
forgotten understandings of what is “normal.” These recaptured cultural memories 
can then inform contemporary regulation by, at the very least, identifying a wider 
range of potential management goals. 
 
A. Daniel Pauly’s Insight: The Origin of the Shifting Baseline Syndrome 
 
In 1995, marine biologist Daniel Pauly coined the term “shifting baseline 
syndrome” to identify a key problem in fisheries management and modeling: 
fisheries scientists were becoming separated “from the biologists studying marine 
or freshwater organisms and/or communities,” leading those scientists “to factor 
out ecological and evolutionary considerations from our models.”40 The resulting 
myopic focus on fishers, fishing fleets, and catch numbers induced the syndrome, 
which  
 
has arisen because each generation of fisheries scientists accepts as a 
baseline the stock size and species composition that occurred at the 
beginning of their careers, and uses this to evaluate changes. When 
the next generation starts its career, the stocks have further declined, 
but it is the stocks at that time that serve as a new baseline. The result 
obviously is a gradual shift of the baseline, a gradual accommodation 
of the creeping disappearance of resource species, and inappropriate 
reference points for evaluating economic losses resulting from 
overfishing, or for identifying targets for rehabilitation measures.41 
 
What fisheries scientists needed, Pauly continued, was a method for 
incorporating historical observations of fisheries abundance and species 
diversity—generally dismissed as “anecdotes”—into contemporary fishery 
management policy, much as contemporary astronomers incorporate ancient 
observations “of sunspots, comets, supernovae, and other phenomena” and 
oceanographers continue to make use of the physical data collected by mariners 
from at least the 19th century.42 Citing two such historical looks at fishing impacts 
with approval, Pauly concluded that “[f]rameworks that maximize the use of 
fisheries history would help us to understand and to overcome—in part at least—
the shifting baseline syndrome, and hence to evaluate the true social and ecological 
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B. Use of the Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Fisheries Management 
 
Pauly and other marine scientists have now documented the shifting baseline 
syndrome in fisheries around the world.44 Moreover, these scientists have 
institutionalized the collection of historical fisheries data as one means of 
counteracting the syndrome,45 essentially arguing that the more they can document 
the actual historical state of fisheries and marine ecosystems, the greater the chance 
that fisheries policies and catch limits will reflect both the true historical abundance 
of targeted fish species and the complexity of the marine ecosystems of which these 
species were a part.  
Legal scholars, in turn, have argued that emerging historical insights into 
ecosystem change from these biological and ecological reconstructions should 
broadly inform current marine management policy and law. 46 Moreover, historical 
 
44 E.g., Fiona T. Francis, Brett R. Howard, Adrienne E. Berchtold, Trevor A. Branch, Laís C.T. 
Chaves, Jillian C. Dunic, Brett Favaro, Kyla M. Jeffrey, Luis Malpica-Cruz, Natalie Maslowski, 
Jessica A. Schultz, Nicola S. Smith, & Isabelle M. Côté, Shifting headlines? Size trends of 
newsworthy fishes, 7 PEERJ e6395 (2019), doi: 10.7717/peerj.6395; H.A. Maia, R.A. Morais, A.C. 
Siqueira, N. Hanazaki, S.R. Floeter,  & M.G. Bender, Shifting baselines among traditional fishers 
in São Tomé and Príncipe islands, Gulf of Guinea, 154 OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT 133, 
133-142 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2018.01.006; Sean Berger, Historical 
Ecology and Shifting Baseline Syndrome in the Kawartha Lakes, Ontario (M.A. Thesis, Trent 
University, 2018), available at https://search.proquest.com/docview/2042371835?pq-
origsite=primo; Maite Erauskin-Extramiana, Sharon  Z. Herzka, Gustavo Hinojosa-Arango, & 
Octavio Aburto-Oropeza, An interdisciplinary approach to evaluate the status of large-bodied 
Serranid fisheries: The case of Magdalena-Almejas Bay lagoon complex, Baja California Sur, 
Mexico,  145 OCEAN & COASTAL MANAGEMENT 21, 21-34 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2017.05.005; Annabel A. Plumeridge & Callum M. Roberts, 
Conservation targets in marine protected area management suffer from shifting baseline syndrome: 
A case study on the Dogger Bank, 116 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 395, 395-404 (2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2017.01.012; Tomaso Fortibuoni, Diego Borme, Gianluca 
Franceschini, Otello Giovanardi, & Sasa Raicevich, Common, rare or extirpated? Shifting baselines 
for common angelshark, Squatina squatina (Elasmobranchii: Squatinidae), in the Northern Adriatic 
Sea (Mediterranean Sea), 772 HYDROBIOLOGIA 247, 247-51 (2016), DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10750-016-2671-4; A. J. Venkatachalam,  A. R. G. Price,  S. 
Chandrasekara,  S. Senaratna Sellamuttu, &  J. Kaler, Changes in Frigate Tuna Populations on the 
South Coast of Sri Lanka: Evidence of the Shifting Baseline Syndrome from Analysis of Fisher 
Observations, 20 MARINE & FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS 167, 167-76 (2010), https://doi-
org.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/10.1002/aqc.1068; Samuel T Turvey, Leigh A. Barrett, Hao Yujiang, 
Zhang Lei, Zhang Xivqiao, Wang Xianyan, Huang Yadong, zhou Kaiya, Tom Hart, & Wang Ding, 
Rapidly Shifting Baselines in Yangtze Fishing Communities and Local Memory of Extinct Species, 
24 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 778-87 (2010); Cameron H. Ainsworth, Tony J. Pitcher, & Christovel 
Rotinsulu, Evidence of Fishery Depletion and Shifting Cognitive Baselines in Eastern Indonesia, 
141 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 848-859 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2008.01.006. 
45 E.g., Dirk Zeller, Rainer Froese, & Daniel Pauly, On Losing and Recovering Fisheries and Marine 
Science Data, 29 MARINE POL’Y 69, 69-73 (2005), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2004.02.003; 
Jeremy B.C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of Coastal Ecosystems, 
293 SCIENCE 629-637 (2001).  
46 E.g., Eric A. Bilsky, Conserving Marine Wildlife through World Trade Law, 30 MICHIGAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 599, 602-03 (2009); Robin Kundis Craig, Taking Steps Toward 
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reflection on the law’s influence on a particular fishing industry over time can 
suggest improvements to the regulation of that industry.47 Even Pauly himself 
published in a law review to argue that the historical evidence of dramatic 
reductions in marine fish stocks necessitates the legal creation of marine reserves 
as well as the elimination of subsidies to fishers.48 
 
C. The Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Ecology, Conservation, and 
Ecological Management 
 
As a concept, the shifting baseline syndrome has also moved beyond fisheries. 
In particular, researchers have acknowledged the importance of this syndrome to 
other areas of ecological regulation, such as endangered species protection,49 
ecological restoration,50 and ecosystem management more generally.51 Under this 
more generalized conception of “environmental generational amnesia,”52 “each 
generation grows up being accustomed to the way their environment looks and 
feels, and so, in a system experiencing progressive impoverishment, they do not 
recognize how degraded it has become over the course of previous generations.”53 
Multiple studies outside of fisheries have empirically demonstrated 
intergenerational differences in resource perception, from bird species in Yorkshire 
to deforestation in the Beni, Bolivia, to water availability and quality in Alaska.54 
These studies indicate that the shifting baseline syndrome operates in regulatory 
regimes to keep ecosystems in impoverished states,55 but they also suggest that 
when historical reconstructions can take hold and correct those shifted perceptions, 
 
Marine Wilderness Protection? Fishing and Coral Reef Marine Reserves in Florida and Hawaii, 
34 MCGEORGE LAW REVIEW 155, 157 (2003); Robin Kundis Craig, Taking the Long View of Ocean 
Ecosystems: Historical Science, Marine Restoration, and the Oceans Act of 2000, 29 ECOLOGY LAW 
QUARTERLY 649 (2002). 
47 Danielle Ringer, Courtney Carothers, Rachel Donkersloot, Jesse Coleman, & Paula Cullenberg, 
For generations to come? The privatization paradigm and shifting social baselines in Kodiak, 
Alaska's commercial fisheries, 98 MARINE POL’Y 97, 97-103 (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2018.09.009. 
48 Daniel Pauly, Unsustainable Marine Fisheries, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT L. & POL’Y 10, 
10-11 (2006). 
49 E.g., Frank Sturges, Humane Society of the United States v. Zinke (D.C. Cir 2017): Shifting 
Baselines in the Endangered Species Act, 43 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 225 (2019). 
50 Matias Guerrero-Gatica, Enrique Aliste, & Javier Simonetti, Shifting Gears for the Use of the 
Shifting Baseline Syndrome in Ecological Restoration, 11 SUSTAINABILITY 1458 (2019). 
51 Masashi Soga & Kevin J. Gaston, Shifting Baseline Syndrome: Causes, Consequences, and 
Implications, 16 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 222-30 (2018). 
52 P.H. Kahn Jr., Children’s affiliations with nature: structure, development, and the problem of 
environmental generational amnesia, in CHILDREN AND NATURE: PSYCHOLOGICAL, 
SOCIOCULTURAL, AND EVOLUTIONARY INVESTIGATIONS (P.H KAHN JR. & S.R. KELLERT EDS.) 93, 
93-94 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002). 
53 Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 222. 
54 Id. at 223. 
55 Guerrero-Gatica, Aliste, & Simonetti, supra note 50, at 1460; Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 
222. 
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more productive management decisions and even, in some cases, restoration 
become possible. Arguably, therefore. “the fundamental driver of [the shifting 
baseline syndrome is the lack, or paucity, of relevant historical data on the natural 
environment.”56 “Without reliable historical environmental data, people cannot 
infer whether long-term environmental changes have occurred, nor to what extent, 
and so they have little choice but to define baselines according to their own 
knowledge and experiences . . . .”57 
Ecological studies of the shifting baseline syndrome outside of fisheries have 
been increasing, with direct expectations for policymakers and managers.58 For 
example, defining the shifting baseline syndrome “as a downward shift in 
perceptions or expectations of an environmental baseline as a consequence of 
biological change,” Guerrero-Gatica et al. argue that accurate descriptions of how 
the shifting baseline syndrome is actually operating in a given specific system may 
not only improve conservation and restoration efforts but also identify mismatches 
in science-based management goals and community expectations.59 In turn, Soga 
and Gaston traced three specific consequences of the shifting baseline syndrome, 
all of which are directly relevant to environmental policymaking. “The first, and 
most immediate, is an increased societal tolerance for progressive environmental 
degradation, including declining wildlife populations, loss of natural habitats, and 
increasing pollution.”60 “Second, [the shifting baseline syndrome] is also likely to 
alter people’s expectations as to what is a desirable (i.e. worth protecting) state of 
the natural environment.”61 “Third, if policy makers and resource managers have 
false perceptions of past environmental conditions, they may set inappropriate 
targets for environmental conservation, restoration, and management programs.”62 
Thus, they advocate increasing monitoring and data collection, including 
reconstructing historical conditions from the available data.63 
Notably, recovering historical ecological data can correct current management 
misperceptions in multiple directions. While, for the most part, such historical 
reconstructions confirm that contemporary perceptions of “normal” are in fact 
highly impoverished, occasionally other lessons emerge. For example, an historical 
reconstruction of Caribbean monk seal populations indicates that the species’ 
population was always small and fragmented and that its extinction resulted from a 
number of factors, challenging the common wisdom that human hunters decimated 
a large and thriving population.64 Thus, sometimes contemporary assumptions 
 
56 Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 224. 
57 Id. 
58 Guerrero-Gatica, Aliste, & Simonetti, supra note 50, at 1462 & 1463 fig. 2. 
59 Id. at 1467-68. 
60 Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 225. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 226 (citations omitted). 
63 Id. at 226-28. 
64 Julio A. Baisre, Shifting Baselines and the Extinction of the Caribbean Monk Seal, 27 CONSERV. 
BIOL 927, 933 (2013), DOI: 10.1111/cobi.l2107. 
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about how we arrived at current realities are just wrong.65 
 
D. From Ecology to Regulatory Regimes: The Regulatory Shifting 
Baseline Syndrome 
 
Because the shifting baseline syndrome has always emerged from subjective 
human perception and psychology rather than objective ecological reality, there is 
no reason that human “forgetting” (societal or generational amnesia) would not be 
an important factor in other areas of human management besides fisheries and 
ecological conservation. Indeed, commenters have concluded that the syndrome 
has been at work in everything from personal weight gain66 to government and 
business leadership67 to religious doctrine68 to the acceptance of non-tenure track 
positions in higher education.69  
To deal with these multiplying applications of “shifting baseline syndrome,” 
conservation biologists helpfully have identified two forms of the syndrome: 
generational amnesia and personal amnesia.70 Like Pauly’s original 
characterization of the shifting baseline syndrome in fisheries, this Article is more 
interested in generational amnesia, which “describes individuals setting their 
perceptions from their own experience, and failing to pass their experience on to 
future generations. Thus, as observers leave a system, the population’s perception 
of normality up-dates and past conditions are forgotten.”71 This form of the shifting 
baseline syndrome “is a cautionary tale referring to changing human perceptions of 
biological systems due to loss of experience about past conditions.”72 Viewing the 
 
65 See also, e.g., Simon Albert, Mark Love, & Tom D. Brewer, Contrasts in Social and Ecological 
Assessments of Coral Reef Health in Melanesia, 67 PAC. SCI. 409, 409-24 (2013) (concluding that 
residents of the Solomon Islands perceive their coral reefs to be more degraded from historical 
conditions that they actually are, while people in Fiji failed to perceive that their coral reefs had 
degraded). 
66 Randy Olson, Slow Motion Disaster Below the Waves, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2002 12:00 AM PT), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-nov-17-op-olson17-story.html (“If your ideal 
weight used to be 150 pounds and now it’s 160, your baseline—as well as your waistline—has 
shifted.”). 
67 Art Petty, Leadership and Shifting Baseline Syndrome, GOV’T EXEC. (April 28, 2017), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/04/leadership-and-shifting-baseline-
syndrome/137276/. 
68 Matt, Shifting Baseline Syndrome and the Church, CHURCHTHOUGHT (Oct. 21, 2013), 
http://churchthought.com/shifting-baseline-syndrome-church/. 
69 Josh Boldt, Off Track: Higher Education’s Shifting Baseline Syndrome, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Dec. 10, 2013), https://community.chronicle.com/news/211-off-track-higher-
education-s-shifting-baseline-syndrome.  
70 S.K. Papworth, J. Rist, L. Coad, & E.J. Milner-Gulland, Evidence for shifting baseline syndrome 
in conservation, 2 CONSERVATION LETTERS 93, 93 (2009), doi: 10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00049.x. 
71 Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, “Personal amnesia describes individuals updating their own 
perception of normality; so that even those who experienced different previous conditions believe 
that current conditions are the same as past conditions.” Id. 
72 Id. 
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syndrome more broadly, it is from this generational perspective on societal amnesia 
that the role of public law as a memory institution becomes most important, 
allowing regulatory regimes to remind future generations why they exist. 
One should always be cautious in hoping that more information will change 
people’s minds about public policy.73 Even in ecological studies, scientists 
recognize that “the availability of (even very good) empirical evidence has not 
always been sufficient to convince people of historical trends in environmental 
conditions. Recent examples of belief- rather than evidence-based environmental 
policy making raise the possibility that [the shifting baseline syndrome] could even 
accelerate in an age of increasing data availability.”74  
Nevertheless, efforts to identify and correct the regulatory shifting baseline 
syndrome may have an advantage over efforts to correct ecological shifting baseline 
syndromes. While ecological change might have many causes,75 and historical 
accounts of prior bounty dismissed as exaggerated tall tales,76 there is no escaping 
the fact that humans, and humans alone, create regulatory regimes. Therefore, the 
fact that past legislatures, regulatory agencies, and other policymakers bothered to 
engage in this labor is inescapable evidence that they thought something was 
wrong. In this very real sense, public law is historical knowledge, and its 
persistence over time renders it a cultural memory institution.  
There are, of course, excellent reasons to change established regulatory 
regimes. As the Introduction noted, legal regimes grounded in an outdated scientific 
model of how ecological and biogeological systems actually function should be 
updated to reflect new science. Evolving conceptions of ethics and morality may 
also undermine past legal regimes; in the United States, the abolishment of slavery77 
and the progressive elimination of the death penalty78 are two prominent examples 
of this motivation for legal change.  
Nevertheless, many public law regulatory regimes reflect the fact that we have 
 
73 E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 20, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/02/27/why-facts-dont-change-our-minds; Timothy D. 
Hanks & Christopher Summerfield, Perceptual decision making in rodents, monkeys, and 
humans, 93 NEURON 15, 22 (2017). 
74 Soga & Gaston, supra note 51, at 224. 
75 Katharina E. Fabricius & Glenn De'ath, Identifying Ecological Change and Its Causes: A Case 
Study on Coral Reefs, 14 Ecol. Applications 1448, 1448 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1890/03-5320. 
76 Loren McClenachan, Andrew B. Cooper, Matthew G. McKenzie, & Joshua A. Drew, The 
Importance of Surprising Results and Best Practices in Historical Ecology, 65 BIOSCIENCE 932, 
932-33, 938 (2015), https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biv100. 
77 U.S. CONST., amend 13, § 1 (ratified 1865). 
78 E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars 
Louisiana from imposing the death penalty as a sanction for the rape of a child when the crime did 
not result, and was not intended to result, in the death of the child); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002) (holding unconstitutional Virginia’s application of the death penalty to the mentally 
disabled); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that imposition of the death 
penalty is unconstitutional when the defendant committed the murder at age 15); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 286-305 (1976) (holding that North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty for 
first-degree murder is unconstitutional). 
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learned something important about ourselves as human beings—particularly about 
the cumulative societal impacts of multitudinous (e.g., polluters) or domineering 
(e.g., 19th-century monopolists) individual behavioral impulses playing out on a 
national stage, destabilizing or otherwise deleteriously affecting various aspects of 
the public commons.79 As the next three parts suggest, these experiential lessons, 
memorialized in regulatory regimes, are unlikely to lose their value unless and until 
human nature itself fundamentally transforms. They explore the workings of the 
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in three very different contexts—financial 
regulation, vaccines, and water quality protection—to suggest the different ways in 
which the syndrome can illuminate and inform discussions of whether and how to 
reform public law regimes. 
 
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE 2008 ECONOMIC CRASH AS THE PRODUCT OF 
A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 
 
There are many, many ways to tell the story of the 2008 financial crisis. 
“Unrelenting greed,” for example, is a popular narrative, particularly in Hollywood 
movies.80 “Regulators asleep at the wheel” is another.81 More academically, the 
crash can be considered one of several critical junctures in corporations and 
 
79 While the fit is not always exact, this article refers to many of the public goods (however 
aspirational some of them remain) of U.S. society—equal access to voting and other aspects of 
political processes, a stable economy, public health, a clean environment—as commons resources 
or common-pool resources in the sense that Elinor Ostrom and her co-authors defined it: “natural 
and human-constructed resources in which (i) exclusion of beneficiaries through physical and 
institutional means is especially costly, and (ii) exploitation by one user reduces resource availability 
for others.” Elinor Ostrom, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, & David 
Policansky, Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges, 284 SCIENCE 278, 278 
(1999). Public law often operations as an exclusion by limiting how individual entities (persons, 
corporations, political parties, even in some circumstances governments) can affect or operate with 
the relevant commons and often is quite costly (economically and politically) to enact/promulgate, 
build capacity for implementing, and enforce. Nevertheless, in the absence of those regimes, 
exploitation for the benefit of those individual entities can put the entire public good at risk for 
everyone. “Commons” terminology the aptly undergirds a discussion of the regulatory shifting 
baseline syndrome because both describe situations in which governance is an important option 
mediating the oft-occurring tensions between the drives and motivations of individual entities and 
the best interests of the public as a whole. As Garrett Hardin famously recognized in 1968, the 
unrestrained drives of individuals can lead to tragedies for the larger society. Garrett Hardin, The 
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-45 (1968). However, “tragedies of the commons 
are real, but not inevitable”—although the governance challenges multiply as the scale of the 
commons increases. Ostrom et al., supra, at 281-82. 
80 See, e.g., “The Big Short” (2015); “99 Homes” (2014); “The Queen of Versailles” (2012); 
“Margin Call” (2011); “Inside Job” (2010). 
81 See, e.g., Chana Joffe-Walt, Regulating AIG: Who Fell Asleep on the Job?, NPR ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (June 5, 200911:10 AM ET), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104979546; Tami Luhby, Bank 
regulators:”Asleep at the switch,” CNN MONEY (March 4 2008: 5:33 PM EST), 
https://money.cnn.com/2008/03/04/news/companies/senatebank/index.htm. 
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financial law,82 during which, “overall, there was a systemic breakdown in 
accountability and ethics that led to a crisis.”83  
This Part contributes to this ongoing discussion by arguing that the 2008 
financial crisis was also, at least in part, the product of a recurring regulatory 
shifting baseline syndrome in the United States. If, as Jeff Cohodes has recently 
argued, financial “regulation exists to both prevent the next financial crisis and 
systemic failures, as well as protect against an idiosyncratic bank failure in the 
future,” but always operates in tension with banks’ and financial firms’ willingness 
to take risks to increase returns,84 then the syndrome, induced by a perceived shifted 
baseline of market stability, helped to lead both firms and regulators to increase 
private-side risk at the expense of the economic commons’ continued stability. In 
essence, the relevant players all forgot that unregulated banking and securities 
industries (and, yes, aided by the greed of some of their human constituents) are 
more than capable of introducing significant systemic risk into the national and 
global economic systems85—a core historic lesson that the United States had 
already had to learn at least twice before. 
Lesson #1 occurred on October 29, 1929, “Black Tuesday,” when the U.S. stock 
market crashed in a flurry of trading—16 million shares on the New York Stock 
 
82 Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Law’s Critical Junctures, Work in Progress 
presented at the USC Center for Law and Social Science Workshop, January 11, 2021. 
83 Jeff Cohodes, Perspectives on Dodd-Frank Act, Risk Management, and the Financial Crisis of 
2008 from a Former Chief Risk Officer, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 533, 536 (2019). 
84 Id. at 533-34. 
85 In the words of Saule T. Omarova: 
 
As this crisis demonstrated, the interconnection between retail financial markets and 
wholesale financial markets is a complex phenomenon, which raises serious questions 
about the continuing wisdom of a deregulatory approach to wholesale financial markets. 
Not only did the crisis show that even the wealthiest and the most financially savvy 
investors are vulnerable to irrational exuberance and, at times, outright fraud, it has also 
highlighted the extent of indirect exposure of the general investing public, the retail 
consumers of financial services, to the risks inherent in complex financial transactions in 
institutional markets. 
 
Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the “Big Picture” 
Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 161 (2009). Moreover: 
 
More generally, the current financial crisis has brought to light that, as a result of rapid 
financial innovation in recent years, risk has become a financial asset in its own right. As 
a financial asset, risk is continuously dissected, priced, and traded in a variety of 
increasingly esoteric transactions among sophisticated entities. The financial crisis also 
drew attention to a hidden paradox: while this virtually limitless “slicing and dicing” of 
financial risk may decrease risk exposure for individual market players, it tends to increase 
the overall riskiness and vulnerability of the financial system. 
 
Id. at 162. 
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Exchange in a single day.86 “Billions of dollars were lost, wiping out thousands of 
investors. In the aftermath of Black Tuesday, America and the rest of the 
industrialized world spiraled downward into the Great Depression (1929-39), the 
deepest and longest-lasting economic downturn in the history of the Western 
industrialized world up to that time.”87 The crash enacted a rather violent correction 
to the wide and often financially unfounded speculation that had occurred during 
the 1920s, “leaving stocks in great excess of their real value” in the face of declining 
production, rising unemployment, “low wages, the proliferation of debt, a 
struggling agricultural sector and an excess of large bank loans that could not be 
liquidated.”88 
“The experience of the Great Depression changed attitudes regarding the 
regulation of financial markets.”89 First, the 1929 crash spurred the development of 
U.S. securities law.90 “After a series of hearings that brought to light the severity of 
the abuses leading to the crash of 1929, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 
(the ‘Securities Act’), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘Exchange 
Act’).”91 Designed in particular to curb the lack of information, and often outright 
fraud, that had spurred the unwarranted investment frenzies of the 1920s, these laws 
required companies to disclose information about themselves and their securities 
and created significant liability for fraud.92  
Second, the crash and the ensuing Depression led to changes in banking laws.93 
Indeed, “Much of the current system is the result of changes put in place during the 
1930s.”94 All told, “[t]he reforms in the first half of the twentieth century created a 
system of regulatory agencies, most of which remain today, that were organized by 
financial activity. Separate agencies focused on separate activities, often with very 
 




89 Matthew Sherman, Center for Economic and Policy Research, A Short History of Financial 
Deregulation in the United States 3 (July 2009), available at 
https://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/dereg-timeline-2009-07.pdf. The Glass-Steagall Act, 
also known as the Banking Act of 1933, was the Act of June 16, 1933, 48 Stat. 162, and is codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 641, 71a, 197a, 221a, 227, 263, 333-339, 348a, 371a-371d, 374a, 375a, 
378, 632. 
90 Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, Securities law history, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (as viewed Sept. 7, 2020). See also 
Sherman, supra note 89, at 4 (describing these same developments). 
91 Id. The Securities Act of 1933, also known as the Fletcher-Rayburn Securities Act of 1933 or the 
Truth in Securities Act, was the Act of May 27, 1933, 48 Stat. 74, and is codified as amended as 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was the Act of June 6, 1934, 48 Stat. 881, 
and is codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78qq. 
92 Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School, Securities law history, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history (as viewed Sept. 7, 2020). 
93 Sherman, supra note 89, at 3-4. 
94 Id. at 3. See also Bank & Cheffins, supra note 82, at 1-2 
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different priorities.”95 These new regulatory regimes remained in place with only 
small changes for over four decades.96 
After the United States climbed out of the Depression and emerged from World 
War II as an international superpower, it enjoyed over half a century of relative 
economic stability. To be sure, its economy was punctuated with bear markets and 
bull markets and the occasional recession, but it suffered nothing close to the 
systemic collapse that occurred on Black Tuesday. Problem apparently solved. 
The problem seemed to be so well solved, in fact, that deregulation was deemed 
appropriate and desirable beginning in the 1980s.97 As other scholars have 
recognized, albeit it in different terms, the perceived baselines regarding the 
economy had shifted. For example, Israel Shaked, Paul D’Arezzo, and David 
Plastino have focused on changing attitudes about saving and having cash on 
hand.98 Importantly, however, they also note that: 
 
These trends were likely aided by the so-called “great moderation” 
beginning in the early 1980s that featured shorter and less severe 
economic downturns. Companies on both Wall Street and Main 
Street adapted to what were seen as new economic realities by de-
emphasizing the importance of internally generated cash flows and 
cash reserves.99 
 
James R. Hackney, Jr., in turn, takes a more philosophical bent, locating the shifted 
baseline in the increasing “belief in market efficiency and informational role of 
prices,” which, paradoxically, “held sway through such tumultuous economic times 
as the 1980s real estate boom and collapse that led to the savings and loan crisis, as 
well as the boom in the high-tech (“dot-com”) industry in the 1990s.”100 At the 
same time, comprehension of actual changes in market dynamics—real baselines 
that actually had moved—lagged, but it was these changes that allowed the crisis 
to become a global one.101 
 
95 Legal Information Institute, supra note 67, at 4. 
96 Id. 
97 Sherman, supra note 89, at 4-6; James R. Hackney, Jr., The Enlightenment and the Financial 
Crisis of 2008: An Intellectual History of Corporate Finance Theory, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1257, 
1265 (2010).  Notably, Alan Greenspan, one of the architects of financial deregulation during his 
18-year chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board, in 2008 “admitted that he had put too much 
faith in the self-correcting power of free markets and had failed to anticipate the self-destructive 
power of wanton mortgage lending.” Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on 
Regulation, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 23, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html. 
98 Israel Shaked, Paul D’Arezzo, & David Plastino, Financial Crisis of 2008 and Preliminary 
Framework for Analyzing Financially Distressed Firms, 27 AMER. BANKRUPTCY INST. J. 42, 42 
(2009). 
99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 Hackney, supra note 97, at 1265. 
101 Omarova, supra note 85, at 157-60. 
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In light of inflation rates in the late 1970s that made Depression-era caps on 
interest rates unworkable, “President Carter signed into law the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980. The 
legislation established a committee to oversee the complete phase-out of interest 
rate ceilings within six years.”102 More deregulation followed.103 
The most immediate result of this deregulation was Lesson #2: the savings and 
loan crisis of the 1980s.104 This crisis “was undoubtedly a failure of public policy.  
…  Institutions entered markets in which they had little experience, and a vulnerable 
industry expended beyond the reach of its federal safety net. Supervision and 
oversight activities proved to be insufficient, and early intervention was avoided in 
the name of regulatory forbearance.”105 Nevertheless, deregulation continued, 
aided by Alan Greenspan’s appointment as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 
August 1987.106 This deregulation included, for instance, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999, which repealed the post-Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act that had 
prohibited commercial banks from engaging in insurance and securities business.107 
According to Hackney, “the belief in free markets had so permeated political 
thinking that Glass-Steagall seemed like an unnecessary regulatory artifact of the 
New Deal era.”108 In 2000, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA), “which limited federal regulation of most over-the-
counter derivatives,”109 as a rider attached “to an 11,000-page spending bill.”110  
As one might predict, banks began combining functions, and financial firms of 
many sorts began experimenting with new forms of derivatives, including the 
mortgage-back derivatives that most directly precipitated the 2008 crisis.111 In 
2011, the federal Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission singled out the CFMA and 
its undermining of securities regulation as a significant cause of new systemic risk 
in the U.S. economy that ultimately led to the 2008 financial crisis.112 More 
generally, however, the Commission concluded that “this financial crisis was 
avoidable”: “The captains of finance and the public stewards of our financial 
 
102 Sherman, supra note 89, at 6. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control 
Act of 1980 was Public Law No. 96-211, 94 Stat. 132 (Mar. 31, 1980), codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 4a, 93a, 216-216d, 1735f-7a, 1831d and 15 U.S.C. § 1646. 
103 Sherman, supra note 89, at 6-8. 
104 Id. at 8. 
105 Sherman, supra note 89, at 8. 
106 Id. at 8-11. 
107 Hackney, supra note 97, at 1265-66. 
108 Id. at 1266. 
109 Duncan Currie, Why Wall Street Collapsed, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 7, 2011), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2011/02/why-wall-street-collapsed-duncan-currie/. 
110 Sherman, supra note 89, at 11. 
111 Id. at 8-11. 
112 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES xxiv (Jan. 2011), available at 
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310173545/http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.racks
pacecloud.com/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 












2021 REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 25 
system ignored warnings and failed to question, understand, and manage evolving 
risks within a system essential to the well-being of the American public.”113 In 
particular, and most relevant to this Article, “widespread failures in financial 
regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s 
financial markets.”114 Overconfidence and a shifted regulatory baseline were key 
components of the crisis: 
 
The sentries were not at their posts, in no small part due to the widely 
accepted faith in the self-correcting nature of the markets and the 
ability of financial institutions to effectively police themselves. More 
than 30 years of deregulation and reliance on self-regulation by 
financial institutions, championed by former Federal Reserve 
chairman Alan Greenspan and others, supported by successive 
administrations and Congresses, and actively pushed by the powerful 
financial industry at every turn, had stripped away key safeguards, 
which could have helped avoid catastrophe. This approach had 
opened up gaps in oversight of critical areas with trillions of dollars 
at risk, such as the shadow banking system and over-the-counter 
derivatives markets. In addition, the government permitted financial 
firms to pick their preferred regulators in what became a race to the 
weakest supervisor.115 
 
As in 1929, new regulation followed the 2008 crisis, notably the Dodd-
Frank Act.116 Nevertheless, the fact that the pursuit of private profit in un- or 
underregulated banking and securities industries will eventually destabilize the 
entire economy seems to be a cultural memory that U.S. regulators find 
increasingly easy to forget: barely a decade after the 2008 crisis, the federal 
government began once again deregulate the financial industry.117  
 
113 Id. at xvii. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at xviii. 
116 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376 (July 21, 2020), codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1b, 6b-1, 6r-6s, 7b-3, 24a, 26; 12 U.S.C. §§ 4b, 16, 
25b, 214d, 247b, 1465, 1467b, 1701x-2, 1831c, 1831o-1, 1850a, 1851-1852, 2806, 3353-3355, 
4719, 5109, 5112, 5219a, 5219b, 5220b, 5301-5497, 5511-5567, 5581-5587, 5601-5628, 5641; 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77z-2a, 78c-2 to 78c-5, 78d-4 to 78d-9, 78j-2 to 78j-3, 78m-1, 78 m-2, 78n-1, 78n-2, 78o-
4a, 78o-7, 78o-9 to 78o-11 78u-6, 78u-7, 78pp, 80b-18b, 80b-18c, 1638a, 1639b-1639h, 1691c-2, 
1693o-1, 1693o-2, 7220, 8201-8232, 8301-8325, 8341-8344; 18 U.S.C. § 3301; 22 U.S.C. § 286tt; 
and 31 U.S.C. § 313-314. 
117 For example, Mark Lebovitch and Jacob Spaid warned in February 2019 that: 
 
Nearly two years into the Trump presidency, extensive deregulation is raising risks 
for investors. Several of the administration’s priorities are endangering financial 
markets by reducing corporate accountability and transparency. SEC enforcement 
actions under the Administration continue to lag previous years. The Trump 
administration has also instructed the SEC to study reducing companies’ reporting 
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It is true, of course, that particular market crashes are difficult to predict. It is 
also true that financial markets and instruments change, introducing both new 
benefits and new problems. What does not change, however, are the facts that 
individuals and firms want to make money and that their cumulative creativity in 
doing so can eventually introduce systemic risk into the economy as a whole. 
Recognizing this fact, Evan Turgeon has argued that the Depression-era regulatory 
baseline was the correct one—that is, “to best serve all members of society, the 
government should seek to mitigate market risk, while the market should seek to 
maximize rewards (which it already does)..”118 
Corporate and financial regulatory regimes thus offer fairly clear case studies 
of how periods of relative economic stability can induce a regulatory shifting 
baseline syndrome. The syndrome distorts perceptions of potential systemic risk, 
allowing private profit interests to push a deregulation agenda that undermines the 
public law regimes that protect the national (and now international) economic 
system. Arguably, U.S. governance is particularly susceptible to this specific 
manifestation of the syndrome because wide swaths of American society benefit 
from bull markets, undermining public resistance to regulatory “reform” that 
promises more of the same. New Deal-era statutes like the repealed Glass-Steagall 
Act thus still have an important cultural memory function to play in protecting the 
public economic commons, perhaps best summed up in a simple question: Would 
we be so eager to dismantle these rules if it were 1930?119 
 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE CONTEMPORARY ANTI-VAXXER MOVEMENT AS 
A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 
 
The United States declared measles eliminated within its borders in 2000.120 
Nevertheless, between mid-December 2014 and mid-February 2015, the Disney 
theme parks in Anaheim, California, appeared to be ground zero of a new measles 
outbreak. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) documented at 
 
obligations to investors, including by abandoning a hallmark of corporate 
disclosure: the quarterly earnings report. Meanwhile, President Trump and 
Congress have passed new legislation loosening regulations on the same banks that 
played a central role in the Great Recession. 
 
Mark Lebovitch & Jacob Spaid, “In Corporations We Trust: Ongoing Deregulation and 
Government Protections,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/06/in-corporations-we-trust-ongoing-deregulation-and-
government-protections/. 
118 Evan N. Turgeon, Boom and Bust for Whom? The Economic Philosophy Behind the 2008 
Financial Crisis, 4 VIRG. L. & BUS. REV. 139, 182 (2009). 
119 My thanks to Acting Professor Menesh Patel, U.C. Davis School of Law, for this formulation. 
120 Morgan Krakow, A tourist infected with measles visited Disneyland and other Southern 
California hot spots in mid-August, THE WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2019, 10:36 a.m. MDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/08/24/tourist-infected-with-measles-visited-
disneyland-other-southern-california-hotspots-mid-august/ 













2021 REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 27 
least 125 measles cases in the United States that winter, 110 of which involved 
California residents.121 Of the California residents, 49 were unvaccinated, including 
12 infants too young to be vaccinated; another 47 patients’ vaccination status was 
unknown or undocumented; and a handful of others were undervaccinated (i.e., 
lacking the full course of shots).122 Notably, of the 37 vaccine-eligible patients who 
definitely were not vaccinated, 28 had purposely chosen to remain unvaccinated 
“because of personal beliefs.”123 
Measles outbreaks in the United States spiked again in 2019, with the CDC 
confirming 1282 cases in 31 states.124 Noting that “[t]his is the greatest number of 
cases reported in the U.S. since 1992,” it emphasized again that “[t]he majority of 
cases were among people who were not vaccinated against measles.”125 
Vaccination is a particularly important protection when it comes to measles because 
“[m]easles is one of the most contagious viruses in the world. Around 90 percent 
of unvaccinated people exposed to the virus will contract the disease within seven 
to 21 days,” with death as one potential outcome.126  
Measles has made a comeback in the United States and other countries because 
of “mistrust and misinformation campaigns about vaccine safety,”127 a 
phenomenon known more colloquially as the Anti-Vaxxer Movement.128 This Part 
argues that the contemporary Anti-Vaxxer Movement, and the relaxations of 
vaccine mandates that have both accompanied and promoted it, is potentially the 
most tragic example of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome at work in the 
United States today. 
 
A. Vaccination and the Public Health Commons 
 
Although not as intuitively obvious as air or water, or even the national 
economy, public health is a commons resource,129 where the well-being of society 
 
121 Jennifer Zipprich, Kathleen Winter, Jill Hacker, Dongxiang Xia, James Watt, & Kathleen 
Harriman, Measles Outbreak — California, December 2014–February 2015, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 




124 Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Measles Cases and Outbreaks (as updated Dec. 2, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html. 
125 Id. 
126 Krakow, supra note 120. 
127 Id. 
128 See, e.g., Katie M. Palmer, Why Did Vaccinated People Get Measles at Disneyland? Blame the 
Unvaccinated, WIRED (Jan. 8, 2015, 6:08 a.m.), https://www.wired.com/2015/01/vaccinated-
people-get-measles-disneyland-blame-unvaccinated/ (noting that “most of the people stricken with 
Mickey Mouse measles do not understand how vaccines work, because they didn’t get them. The 
vast majority of the infected were unvaccinated against the disease, including kids who were too 
young for the shots and anti-vaxxers who chose against them. That’s how you get an outbreak.”). 
129 Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and 
Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE (Richard A. Goodman, Richard E. Hoffman, 
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as a whole depends upon—and can be destroyed by—the cumulative effects of 
individual choices. For the first time in many decades, all Americans experienced 
this reality firsthand in the 2020-2021 pandemic, and that experience should have 
revived cultural memories regarding the importance of public health regimes that 
reduce the risks of dying from dread diseases. Whether a substantial majority of 
Americans will remember remains in some question, but the pandemic and the 
public’s recurring rejection of masks and social distancing has brightly illuminated 
the public-private interplay of public health.  
This dynamic between individual behavior and collective health is also at play 
with respect to vaccine-preventable diseases. Sufficiently large numbers of 
individual choices to get vaccinated against a particular disease eventually creates 
herd immunity.130 Herd immunity, in turn, protects those individuals who either 
cannot be vaccinated or who fall within the small percentage of vaccinated 
individuals who do not develop a strong enough immune response to keep them 
from getting the disease.131 Thus, reducing private and public disease risk from 
these diseases are inextricably intertwined. 
Moreover, public health professionals already recognize that vaccination 
programs can shift both the objective societal disease regulatory baseline and the 
subjective individual risk-risk calculation of getting vaccinated.132 Vaccines thus 
present an interesting case study of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome 
because successful vaccination programs create both legitimate and objectively 
verifiable shifts in the regulatory baseline and illegitimate and subjective regulatory 
shifting baseline syndromes. Legitimate shifts result from scientifically valid 
recalculations of public health risks as vaccines eradicate or radically attenuate a 
disease risk at a societal level. Most famously, smallpox killed about 30% of the 
roughly 50 million people globally who contracted the disease each year before 
vaccination programs began in earnest in the 1950s.133 As a result of these 
vaccination efforts, however, the last natural case of smallpox occurred in 1977.134 
The variola virus that causes smallpox now exists only in laboratories, and 
“[r]outine smallpox vaccination among the American public stopped in 1972 after 
the disease was eradicated in the United States.”135 
 
Willfredo Lopz, Gene W. Matthes, Mark Rothstein, & Karen Foster, eds.) 262, 263 (2007) (citing 
Garrett Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-48 (1968)). 
130 Palmer, supra note 128; Malone & Hinman, supra note129, at 264 (describing herd immunity 
and how the percentage of the vaccinated population required varies by disease). 
131 Palmer, supra note 128; Malone & Hinman, supra note129, at 264 (describing herd immunity 
and how the percentage of the vaccinated population required varies by disease). 
132 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 263. 
133 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BUGS, DRUGS, AND SMOKE: STORIES FROM PUBLIC HEALTH 3-
5 (2011), available through 
https://www.who.int/about/history/publications/public_health_stories/en/. 
134 Id. at 3. 
135 Vaccine Basics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (as updated July 12, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/vaccine-basics/index.html. 
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A less dramatic example of a legitimate regulatory baseline shift occurred with 
polio. The polio vaccine exists in two primary forms. The oral polio vaccine is more 
effective at preventing polio but carries with it a risk of paralysis, which occurs at 
a rate of about 1 in every 2.4 million doses of the vaccine.136 The inactivated polio 
vaccine, in contrast, is less effective at preventing polio but carries no risk of 
paralysis.137 Of course, polio itself can also cause paralysis and death, and so long 
as poliovirus circulated in the United States, the risk of paralysis from the oral 
vaccine “was certainly outweighed by the much larger risk for paralysis from wild 
polioviruses … .”138 However, successful vaccination programs have eradicated 
wild poliovirus from the Western Hemisphere since 1991. As a result, given the 
greatly reduced risk of contracting polio itself, in 2000 the CDC’s Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices recommended that public health officials 
eliminate the risk of vaccine-caused paralysis by switching to the inactivated polio 
vaccine.139 
The contemporary Anti-Vaxxer Movement, in contrast, represents an 
illegitimate shift in risk perception and hence an example of the regulatory shifting 
baseline syndrome, particularly with respect to measles. This syndrome manifests 
in personal decisions not to vaccinate based on incorrect or exaggerated perceptions 
of risk to personal health from the vaccines themselves, particularly childhood 
vaccines, often coupled with assertions of individual liberty or religious rights. 
However, this shift in risk perception and personal unwillingness to participate in 
vaccination programs has been possible on a large scale only because of the very 
success of 20th-century vaccination programs and requirements—that is, because 
at least two generations of Americans have had the luxury of forgetting what it is 
like to live with the constant threat of contracting and dying from last century’s 
dread diseases. As a result of that generational amnesia, however, the diseases in 
question—especially measles—are starting to return. 
 
B. Vaccination Regulation in the U.S. into the Late 20th Century 
 
Immunization practices have existed since the 18th century, when English 
physician Edward Jenner used cowpox to inoculate patients against smallpox.140 
Louis Pasteur added the human rabies vaccine in 1885, along with the concept of 
virus attenuation,141 which allows humans to develop an effective immune response 
to the disease without contracting the disease itself. Polio, diphtheria, tetanus, and 
 




140 Stephanie F. Cave, The History of Vaccinations in the Light of the Autism Epidemic, 14 
ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES 54, 54 (2008). 
141 Id. 
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pertussis vaccines followed by 1946, but injectable vaccines were not invented until 
1955.142  
With this last invention, vaccination programs backed by public health 
regulatory regimes became important public health initiatives in the United States 
from the mid-20th century.143 Since the inception of these vaccination programs, 
“scientists [have] widely consider[ed] immunization to be one of the greatest public 
health achievements of the 20th century, and experts and medical science and 
research agree that timely immunization is vital to staying healthy.”144 
 
1. Federal Vaccination Programs 
 
The federal contribution to immunization most often consists of financing 
programs that make widespread vaccination cheap or free. For example, the first 
federal vaccination program targeted polio,145 and the Poliomyelitis Vaccination 
Assistance Act of 1955146 spurred free mass vaccination by providing federal funds 
to states to pay for the vaccines.147 The Act also allowed the Surgeon General to 
initiate federal polio vaccination delivery, as well.148  
The federal government continues to financially support vaccination programs, 
especially childhood vaccination programs, on a significant scale. Most notably: 
 
Since 1962, the federal government has supported childhood 
vaccination programs through a grant program administered by the 
CDC. These “317” grants, named for the authorizing statute, support 
purchase of vaccine for free administration at local health 
departments and support immunization delivery, surveillance, and 
communication and education.149 
 
Between these 317 grants and the 1994 Vaccines for Children program (discussed 
below), “[a]s of 2000, the CDC purchased over half the childhood vaccine 
administered in the United States … .”150 
 
2. State Vaccination Requirements for School Attendance 
 




144 IVaccinate, Vaccines Are Effective, MICH. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (2019), 
https://ivaccinate.org/about-vaccines/vaccines-are-effective/ 
145 Id. 
146 Act of August 12, 1955, Pub. L. No. 377, 69 Stat. 704. 
147 Id. §§ 3-6. 
148 Id. § 7. 
149 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 268. 
150 Id. 
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The key regulatory component of vaccine program efficacy in the United States 
are state requirements that children be vaccinated before they can attend public 
schools, and often also private schools and daycare facilities.151 Massachusetts 
enacted the first law mandating vaccination in 1809, then enacted the first school 
vaccination requirement in the 1855 “to prevent smallpox transmission in 
schools.”152 In 1905, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,153 the U.S. Supreme Court 
upheld Massachusetts’ (and other states’) authority to mandate vaccinations, 
removing federal constitutional Due Process obstacles to state vaccination laws. 
Specifically, the Court acknowledged that states have broad police power authority 
to protect public health154 and that Jacobson’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
protections did not insulate him from those requirements: 
 
the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is 
necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis 
organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society 
based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be 
confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not 
exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of 
each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person 
or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.155 
 
Moreover, “Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a 
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which 
threatens the safety of its members.”156 
Seventeen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly addressed the City of 
San Antonio, Texas’s school vaccination mandate in Zucht v. King.157 Unlike in 
Jacobson, there was no imminent threat of contagious disease in San Antonio; 
nevertheless, public officials barred Rosalyn Zucht from attending both public and 
private schools because she did not have the required vaccination certificate and 
 
151 State Vaccination Requirements, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (last updated 
Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/state-reqs.html; see also Malone 
& Hinman, supra note 129, at 269 (“School vaccination laws have played a key role in the control 
of vaccine-preventable diseases in the United States.”). 
152 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 269, 271 (citation omitted). 
153 197 U.S. 11 (1905). For the story of how resistance to smallpox vaccine mandates and the five-
year stretch of smallpox epidemics that started in 1900 led to this Supreme Court case, see generally 
MICHAEL WILLRICH, POX: AN AMERICAN STORY (Penguin ed. 2012). 
154 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24-25. 
155 Id. at 26. 
156 Id. at 27. 
157 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
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refused to get vaccinated.158 Relying on Jacobson, the Court found against Zucht 
in three paragraphs, concluding that “it is within the police power of a state to 
provide for compulsory vaccination” and “that a state may, consistently with the 
federal Constitution, delegate to a municipality authority to determine under what 
conditions health regulations shall become operative.”159 
 
b. The Eventual Universality of School Vaccination Mandates 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, when the Court was considering 
Jacobson, “nearly half the states had requirements for children to be vaccinated 
before they entered school. By 1963, when the measles vaccine became 
available,[160] 20 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico had such laws, 
with a variety of vaccines being mandated.”161  
Measles became a critical focus in the expansion of state vaccination mandates 
in the later 1960s, as the United States sought to eradicate that disease, and “[t]hese 
experiences demonstrated that mandatory vaccination could be enforced and was 
effective.”162 In 1977, public health officials pursued a nationwide Childhood 
Immunization Initiative to increase measles vaccination levels in children to 90 
percent by 1979, an effort that induced even more states to enact and enforce school 
vaccination requirements.163 
School vaccination requirements, when strictly enforced, are quite effective in 
preventing disease.164 As a result, “[b]y the 1980-1981 school year, all 50 states 
had laws covering students first entering school,”165 by 1983 all 50 states required 
measles vaccinations,166 and “[a]s of the 1998-1999 school year, all states but four 
(Louisiana, Michigan, South Carolina, and West Virginia) had requirements 
covering all grades from kindergarten through 12th grade.”167 By that point, “[t]he 
requirements covered diphtheria toxoid and polio, measles, and rubella vaccines in 
all 50 states; 49 states required tetanus toxoid, 46 required mumps vaccine, 44 
required pertussis vaccine, and 28 required hepatitis B vaccine.”168 In 2000, the 
Task Force on Community Preventive Services, an independent body that evaluates 
the effectiveness of public health preventive interventions, recommended the use 
 
158 Id. at 175. 
159 Id. at 176 (citations omitted). 
160 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 271. 
161 Id. at 269 (citation omitted). 
162 Id. at 269 (citations omitted). 
163 Id. (citations omitted). 
164 Id. at 270 (citation omitted). 
165 Id. at 270 (citation omitted). 
166 Id. at 271 (citation omitted). 
167 Id. (citations omitted). 
168 Id. (citations omitted). 
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of mandatory vaccination requirements to drastically reduce the incidence of 
vaccine-preventable diseases.169 
 
C. Initial Signals of a Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome:  
Vaccine Lawsuits, the Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, and State 
Vaccine Exemptions 
 
1. Vaccine Litigation and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 
 
No vaccine is risk-free,170 even when properly manufactured and 
administered.171 As noted, the oral polio vaccine can cause paralysis.172 More 
commonly, the person getting vaccinated faces risks of some sort of immune 
reaction, ranging from redness and soreness at the vaccine site to a severe allergic 
reaction that leads to anaphylactic shock and death.173 
In the United States currently, the initial regulatory regime to balance these risks 
personal harm against a new vaccine’s effectiveness in protecting public health is 
the Food & Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) evaluation pursuant to the drug 
provisions of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).174 The federal 
government has been regulating vaccines since the passage of the 1902 Biologics 
Control Act,175 which gave authority to the Marine Health Service’s Laboratory of 
Hygiene (transformed in 1930 into the National Institutes of Health) authority to 
regulate vaccines for safety, purity, and potency.176 “The Laboratory established 
standards and licensed smallpox and rabies vaccines,” then in 1934 added standards 
for efficacy.177  
Although Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938,178 the 
FDA did not have authority over vaccines until 1972, when “the Division of 
Biologics Standards was moved from the National Institutes of Health to the 
 
169 Id. (citing Task Force on Community Preventive Services, Recommendations regarding 
interventions to improve vaccination coverage in children, adolescents, and adults, 18 AMER. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED.  92, 92-96 (2000)). 
170 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273. 
171 Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution 
to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 149 (1988) (citations omitted). 
172 Id. at 150. 
173 National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., last 
reviewed Jan. 2021, https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html 
174 21 U.S.C. §§301-399a. 
175 Linda Bren, The Road to the Biotech Revolution—Highlights from 100 Years of Biologics 
Regulation. FDA CONSUMER 1, 1 (2006), available at 
https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/published/The-Road-to-the-Biotech-Revolution--
Highlights-of-100-Years-of-Biologics-Regulation.pdf; Julie B. Milstein, Regulation of vaccines: 
strengthening the science base, 25 J. PUBLIC HEALTH POL’Y 173, 174 (2004). 
176 Milstein, supra note 175175, at 174, 176. 
177 Id. at 176. 
178 Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, codified as 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399gg. 
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FDA.”179 The FDCA drug approval regime has received more public attention than 
normal during the coronavirus pandemic, but a concise overview is still helpful. 
Under the Act, a “drug” includes any article “intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease” in humans.180 Since 1962, the 
FDCA has prevented the introduction of any new drug in the United States without 
the FDA’s approval,181 which since 1972 has include vaccines.182 To get that 
approval, the manufacturer must prove that a new vaccine is both safe and 
effective.183  
However, drug and vaccine “safety” is not absolute but instead requires the 
FDA to assess whether the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks, a calculus that 
depends on many factors and under which the FDA might be willing to tolerate 
more individual risks and side effects if the vaccine prevents a particularly deadly 
or novel disease.184 Any patient who has received warnings about contraindications 
and side effects from their doctor or pharmacy in connection with a prescription, 
flu vaccine, or now the new coronavirus vaccines has experienced firsthand the 
practical results of FDA risk-benefit balancing. 
Thus, individual risks usually remain for even the most important and effective 
vaccines. One of the first signs that members of the U.S. public were beginning to 
reject the public-oriented focus of vaccination programs185 were the products 
liability torts lawsuits against vaccine manufacturers beginning in the 1950s and 
escalating through the 1980s,186 seeking personal injury damages for those 
individuals that vaccines harmed. These lawsuits began with the Cutter Incident, in 
which Cutter Laboratories released lots of the Salk polio vaccine in which the virus 
had not been properly inactivated despite the fact that Cutter followed federally 
mandated manufacturing procedures. About 200 people were paralyzed and ten 
people died as a result of contracting polio from vaccines from these lots. In 1955, 
the California Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict that Cutter Laboratories was 
liable in tort for these injuries under implied warranty theories, despite the fact that 
the jury explicitly found that Cutter had not been negligent in producing the 
 
179 Milstein, supra note 175, at 177. 
180 21 U.S.C.  § 321(g)(1) (emphasis added). 
181 Id. § 355(a). 
182 Milstein, supra note 175175, at 177. 
183 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). 
184 See id. § 355-1(a)(1) (laying out the risk-benefit analysis and many of the factors to consider). 
185 Miles E. Coleman, An Overview of the National Childhood Vaccination Act, 21 S.C. Lawyer 40, 
40 (2010) (“Throughout the 20th century, as vaccination schedules prescribed more and earlier 
immunizations, there was a growing awareness of the potential dangers of vaccinations and an 
accompanying resistance to immunization. In response, Congress passed the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986”). 
186 Neraas, supra note 171, at 151 (“Lawsuits against manufacturers rose from 24 in 1980 to 
approximately 150 in 1985.”). 
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vaccine.187 The proverbial tort floodgates had been opened, and vaccine litigation 
threatened to leave the United States without vaccine manufacturers.188 
Responding to this “vaccine liability crisis that has threatened the nation’s 
supply of childhood vaccines,”189 Congress intervened with National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (NCVIA), which established the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program (VICP).190 This program provides compensation to 
the patients who are injured by listed vaccines191 while insulating vaccine 
manufacturers from tort liability,192 ensuring that vaccines remain available to the 
population at large. A person who receives a covered vaccine and suffers a 
recognized injury therefrom193 files a petition for recovery in the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims,194 receiving compensation as the Act allows.195 According to the 
U.S. Department of Justice, “Over the past 30 years, the VICP has succeeded in 
providing a less adversarial, less expensive, and less time-consuming system of 
recovery than the traditional tort system that governs medical malpractice, personal 
injury, and product liability cases.  More than 6,000 people have been paid in excess 
of $3.9 billion (combined) since the Program’s 1988 inception,” and “costly 
litigation against drug manufacturers and health care professionals who administer 
vaccines has virtually ceased.”196 
 
2. Exemptions from State Vaccination Mandates 
 
a. Increasing Numbers of State Exemptions from School Vaccination 
Requirements 
 
The NCVIA ensured that childhood vaccines remained available in the United 
States. Nevertheless, changes to state vaccination requirements increasingly 
allowed anti-vaxxers to pursue their individual personal inclinations, allowing 
disease like measles to re-emerge.  
 
187 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322-24 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1955). 
188 Vaccine Injury Compensation Programs, COLL. PHYSICIANS PHILADELPHIA, as updated Jan. 17, 
2018, https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/articles/vaccine-injury-compensation-programs; 
see also Neraas, supra mote 171, at 152 (“Between 1966 and 1977, half the nation’s vaccine 
manufacturers stopped producing and distributing vaccines. By 1985, only four commercial firms 
produced and distributed the primary vaccines used in compulsory vaccination programs.”). 
189 Neraas, supra note 171, at 149. 
190 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to 300aa-23. 
191 Id. §§ 300aa-10(a), 300aa-11(c), 300aa-13(a). 
192 Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 232-33 (2011) (holding that the 
NCVIA preempts state tort law design defect claims). 
193 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14. 
194 Id. § 300aa-11. 
195 Id. § 300aa-15. 
196 Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (updated Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/civil/vicp.  
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Exemptions from state vaccination requirements have been part of the legal 
vaccination landscape almost from the beginning. Even in the 19th century, for 
example, Massachusetts’ vaccination laws allowed “an exception in favor of 
‘children who present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are 
unfit subjects for vaccination.’ ”197 Medical exemptions from vaccination continue 
to find support among public health officials, because “[s]ome people have medical 
conditions that increase the risk for adverse effect, and therefore they should not 
receive vaccines. Recognizing this fact, all state vaccination laws provide for 
exemptions for persons with contraindicating conditions.”198 Utah’s medical 
exemption is fairly typical. While Utah requires students to have a certificate of 
immunization to attend any “public, private, or parochial kindergarten, elementary, 
or secondary school through grade 12, nursery school, licensed day care center, 
child care facility, family care home, or head-start program,”199 children can avoid 
this requirement if they have a physician’s certification that a health condition 
prevents the child from receiving the vaccine.200 
The two other exemptions that emerged in states over time—exemptions for 
religious reasons and exemptions based on personal philosophy—are far less well-
grounded in medicine but instead seek to accommodate other, individual, values. 
The policy and legal issue they raise for contemporary society and the resurgence 
of diseases like measles is whether these personal exemptions should trump the 
greater public good. 
 
b.  Personal Philosophical Exemptions from Vaccine Requirements 
 
Personal philosophical exemptions from vaccination requirements allow 
parents to avoid the school vaccination requirements for their child on the basis of 
personal or moral beliefs.201  These exemptions originated in the British 
Vaccination Act of 1898, which “provided a conscience clause to allow exemptions 
to mandatory smallpox vaccination. This clause gave rise to the term ‘conscientious 
objector,’ which later came to refer to those opposed to military service.”202 
Philosophic objections to mandatory vaccination can hark back to Jacobson’s 
objection to this basic infringement on liberty, arise from a fear of an adverse 
reaction to or contamination from the vaccines, or reflect the parents’ conclusions 
 
197 Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12 (citing MASS. REV. L. chap. 75, § 139). Massachusetts added its medical 
exemption in 1894. Douglas S. Diekema, Personal Belief Exemptions for School Vaccination 
Requirements, 35 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 275, 278 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-
publhealth-032013-182452. 
198 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273. 
199 UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-301 (2020). 
200 Id. §53A-11-302. 
201 States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School Immunization Requirements, 
NATL. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-
immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx 
202 Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions. 
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that their children really aren’t at risk of contracting particular diseases or that the 
diseases for which vaccinations are required really aren’t that bad.203  
States were actively adopting philosophical exemptions between 1970, when 
only “five state allowed exemption from the law if a parent simply objected in 
writing,”204 and 2014. By the beginning of 21st century, 15 states provided 
exemptions for personal philosophical objections—California, Colorado, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.205 By 2014, the number 
had risen to 22, subtracting New Mexico but adding Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri 
(childcare facilities only), Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia (HPV vaccine 
only), and Wisconsin.206 Moreover, use of these exemptions more than doubled.207 
States phrase these exemptions a variety of ways. Harkening back to England, 
Texas allows the exemption if a parent cites “reasons of conscience.”208 Arizona, 
in turn, requires that:  
 
The parent or guardian of the pupil submits a signed statement to the 
school administrator stating that the parent or guardian has received 
information about immunizations provided by the department of 
health services and understands the risks and benefits of 
immunizations and the potential risks of nonimmunization and that 
due to personal beliefs, the parent or guardian does not consent to 
the immunization of the pupil.209 
 
Despite their early 21st-century popularity, however, states can easily eliminate 
philosophical exemptions. As Jacobson and Zucht make clear, these exemptions 
exist purely as a matter of the state’s largesse, politically accommodating parents 
who prefer not to vaccinate their children, often as a result of unwarranted concerns 
about the vaccines. 
 
 
203 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273. 
204 Diekema, supra note 197, at 279 
205 Malone & Hinman, supra note 129, at 273. 
206 This list combines information from States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From 
School Immunization Requirements, NATL. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29, 2021), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx, with that 
web site’s prior incarnation, States With Religious and Philosophical Exemptions From School 
Immunization Requirements, Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. See also 
Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions (also 
counting 20 states before California’s and Vermont’s changes in 2015). 
207 Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES (updated Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.historyofvaccines.org/index.php/content/articles/vaccination-exemptions.  
208 TEX. EDU CODE ANN. § 38.001. 
209 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-873(A)(1). 
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c. Religious Exemptions from Vaccine Requirements 
 
State exemptions from vaccine requirements for religious reasons are both more 
pervasive and potentially more legally and politically difficult to remove, given the 
Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.210 The 
Christian Science Church was particularly active in lobbying for religious 
exemptions in the 20th century, and by 1970 “most states allowed exemption from 
school vaccine requirements … if the parents could demonstrate that the 
vaccination would violate the teachings of a recognized religious organization to 
which they belonged … .”211 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether the First 
Amendment—or, since 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act212—requires 
a religious exemption from mandatory vaccination laws. Indeed, it has signaled just 
the opposite: when offered the opportunity, the Court has gone out of its way to 
suggest that vaccine mandates are insulated from claims of religion freedom. For 
example, its 1944 case of Prince v. Massachusetts addressed the issue of whether a 
Jehovah’s Witness could violate child labor laws on religious grounds.213 Along the 
way to upholding Massachusetts’ conviction of the parent, the Court emphasized 
that: 
 
neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond 
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s 
labor, and in many other ways. … Thus, he cannot claim freedom 
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on 
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not 
include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable 
disease or the latter to ill health or death.214 
 
210 U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
211 Diekema, supra note 197, at 279. 
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
213 321 U.S. 158, 159-60 (1944). 
214 Id. at 166-67 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Indeed, even in 1972 in one of the most 
important cases upholding religious freedom against state schooling requirements, the Supreme 
Court still emphasized that the case was “not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health 
of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be 
properly inferred,” again insulating the decision from directly intruding into public health mandates. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). Moreover, the U.S. Courts of Appeals recently have 
nearly uniformly upheld vaccine  mandates against religious freedom claims. See, e.g., Fallon v. 
Mercy Catholic Medical Center of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 877 F.3d 487, 492-93 (3rd Cir. 2017) 
(holding that a hospital worker’s refusal to comply with a flu vaccination requirement did not give 
rise to a religious discrimination claim and noting that “that we are not the only court to come to the 
conclusion that certain anti-vaccination beliefs are not religious”); Phillips v. City of New York, 
775 F.3d 538, 542-44 (2d Cir. 2015) (upholding New York’s application of its religious exemption 
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Seventy years later, in 2014, a very different Court displayed the same reluctance 
to subject vaccination mandates (or, more technically, requirements that medical 
insurance cover the vaccinations) to the vagaries of individual religious beliefs. In 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court determined that federal mandates 
in the Affordable Care Act requiring that employers provide health insurance that 
covers contraception, to which the employers involved objected on religious 
grounds, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.215 While the case had 
nothing directly to do with vaccination, along the way to its decision (prompted by 
the Department of Health and Human Services), the Court majority made clear that 
its decision did not necessarily extend to vaccines: 
 
Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-
coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an 
employer’s religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as 
immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, 
the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve 
different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing 
them.216 
 
Even the Supreme Court’s most recent coronavirus-related religious freedom 
case, Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,217 does not necessarily 
subject vaccination requirements to constitutional or statutory claims of religious 
freedom. The case upheld a religious freedom First Amendment challenge to the 
New York Governor’s executive order limiting religious services in “red” and 
“orange” zones to 10 and 25 attendees, respectively.218 The Court emphasized that 
the executive order imposed no such crowding  limitations on “essential” 
businesses like liquor and hardware stores, nor did it tailor attendance limitations 
to the size of the church or synagogue,219 constitutionally suspect differentiations 
that a vaccination mandate is unlikely to make. In addition, Justices Breyer, 
 
against challenges from parents seeking exemptions on non-religious grounds); Caviezel v. Great 
Neck Public Schools, 500 Fed. Appx. 16, 18-19 (2d. Cir. 2012) (upholding a New York denial of a 
religious exemption); Workman v. Mingo Co. Bd. Education, 419 Fed. Appx. 348, 354-56 (4th Cir. 
2011) (upholding West Virginia’s lack of a religious exemption).  
215 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014). 
216 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 733 (emphasis added. In addition, as the Court explained at length, the 
application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to state mandates created a separate set of 
constitutional issues, leading to the Court invalidating Congress’s original attempt to do so pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 693-96 (explaining City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997)). 
217 --- U.S. --- 114 S. Ct. 63 (2020). 
218 Id. at 66. 
219 Id. at 66-67. 
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Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented on the merits regardless,220 and both Justices 
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, who voted in the majority, wrote concurring opinions that 
suggest that they might see a vaccination case differently—Justice Gorsuch 
explicitly suggesting that the vaccine requirement in Jacobson might survive strict 
scrutiny,221 Justice Kavanaugh emphasizing the “substantial deference” owed to 
state policy choices during pandemics.222 
In the few cases that exist, State supreme Court explicitly ruled against religious 
freedom claims and upheld vaccine mandates.223 Indeed, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court went so far as to strike down the legislature’s attempted religious exemption 
on grounds that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause.224 Tipping its hand, it first asked, “Is it mandated by the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution that innocent children, too young to decide for 
themselves, are to be denied the protection against crippling and death that 
immunization provides because of a religious belief adhered to by a parent or 
parents?”225 The specter of children suffering “the horrors of crippling and death 
resulting from poliomyelitis or smallpox or from one of the other diseases against 
which means of immunization are known and have long been practiced 
successfully” haunts the rest of the opinion.226 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent lack of constitutional or statutory 
requirement, the vast majority of states avoided Mississippi’s haunting. By the 
beginning of the 21st century, 48 states—all but Mississippi and West Virginia—
allowed exemptions from mandatory school vaccination requirements on religious 
grounds.227 
 
d. Correlations Between Exemptions and Reduced Vaccination Rates 
 
The non-medical exemptions from state school vaccination requirements 
allowed Anti-Vaxxers considerable latitude to exercise their individual choices—
with consequences to public health. To be sure, into the 21st century nationwide 
vaccination rates remained high.228 Nevertheless, of the seven states where more 
than 1% of students used exemptions in the 1997-1998 school year, four—
Colorado, Michigan, Utah, and Washington—had philosophical exemptions.229 
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Moreover, pockets of non-vaccination began to emerge at the community scale, and 
“in some communities, the levels of exemptors may be as high as 5%. In 1995, 84% 
of California schools had fewer than 1% of students with exemptions, but 4% of 
schools had 5% or more with exemptions.”230 The State of Washington, which 
allows all three kinds of exemptions, had “an overall exemption rate of 5.2% in the 
2014-15 school year.”231 Overall, between the 2011-2012 school year and the 2017-
2018 school, use of non-medical exemptions for school vaccination requirements 
has continued to increase, with some states seeing the vaccination rates for 
kindergarteners entering school in Fall 2017 as low as 81.3%.232 
Starting in the late 1980s, exemptions from vaccination also increasingly 
correlated to increased risk of measles, particularly in religious communities, such 
as the Amish. “Salmon et al. found that persons with documented religious or 
philosophic exemptions were 35 times more likely to contract measles than were 
vaccinated persons during 1985-1992. They also found that persons living in 
communities with high concentrations of exemptors were themselves at increased 
risk for measles because of increased risk for exposure.”233 
Thus, individual choices to seek exemptions from state vaccine mandates fairly 
quickly began to impact the public health commons as well as the exemptors 
themselves. It also become clear that legal design was an important factor in 
individuals’ decisions to exploit an exemption: states with complicated processes 
for obtaining their religious and philosophical exemptions maintained high rates of 
student vaccination, while one-third of the states with simple procedures had their 
exemption rates exceed 1% of students.234 
 
D. The Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome and Anti-Vaxxers 
 
1. Anti-Vaxxers in the United States 
 
Resistance to vaccination has existed since inoculations were first invented. 
Indeed, skepticism regarding the efficacy and safety of the earliest inoculation 
practices was often fully justified, given the state of medical science and rather 
loose oversight of practitioners at the time.235 For example, when smallpox was the 
disease of biggest concern: 
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In the late 1800s through the early 1900s, some parents responded 
to school vaccination laws by refusing to send their children to 
school, sending their children to private schools, wiping the vaccine 
from their children's arms following vaccination, attempting to fake 
vaccine scars, and refusing to comply with vaccination 
requirements. This resistance was driven in part by the risks of the 
smallpox vaccine and the risks of inoculation, which included the 
transmission of other diseases, including tetanus. … Opposition to 
vaccination became stronger during the early 1900s when a milder 
form of smallpox, variola minor, became the dominant strain. This 
strain rarely caused death, leading many to conclude that the vaccine 
was more dangerous than the disease it prevented.236 
 
The United States, however, has a long history of vaccine resistance rooted in 
issues other than legitimate concerns about the safety and efficacy of the vaccines 
themselves.237 Many religions and religious leaders, for example, have actively 
discouraged vaccination: “fear of vaccines emerged in the 18th century. Religious 
figureheads often referred to them as ‘the devil’s work’ and actively spoke against 
them.”238 Racism and racial mistrust have played a role in vaccination resistance.239 
Personal liberty objections have also long been important in both England and the 
United States. For example, when England enacted the Vaccinated Act in 1853, 
requiring vaccination against smallpox for infants up to three months old and 
mandating penalties for noncompliance, several organizations formed to resist the 
new mandate, including London’s Anti-Vaccination League.240 In the United 
States, opposition to vaccination mandates reflected uneasiness over the increasing 
intrusion of government into private lives, arguably constituting one of the first 
civil liberty struggles.241 “Parents also protested on the grounds that vaccination 
threatened the safety of their children, usurped their parental authority, and violated 
the bodily integrity of their children.”242 
Current opposition to vaccines in the United States is generally categorized into 
two levels of severity. Some people are still resistant to vaccinating themselves and 
their children. This resistance is known as “vaccine hesitancy,” and it affects 
“motivation, causing people to reject it for themselves or their children…[leading 
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to the] undermine[d] vaccination coverage in specific settings.”243 An “anti-
vaxxer,” in turn, is an individual who is outright opposed to vaccinations for various 
reasons.244 These individuals typically associate with the “anti-vaccination 
movement,” or “anti-vaxxer movement,” in an effort to prevent the use of vaccines 
to immunize people from certain contagious illnesses.245 
With the spectrum of resistance is real, people along the entire spectrum often 
now find justification for their resistance in misleading and false information that 
has made the personal risks from the vaccines themselves seem unduly high. For 
example, “[i]n the 1970s, concern about the possibility of pertussis vaccine causing 
sudden infant death syndrome or infantile spasms led to debate about pertussis 
vaccination requirements, even though studies showed that the vaccine caused 
neither event.”246 Nevertheless, these fears led to an especially substantial 
expansion of the Anti-Vaxxer Movement in the United Kingdom into the 1980s, 
“when parents increasingly refused to vaccinate their children against pertussis in 
response to a report that attributed 36 negative neurological reactions to the 
pertussis vaccine. This caused a decrease in the pertussis vaccine uptake in the 
United Kingdom from 81% in 1974 to 31% in 1980, eventually resulting in a 
pertussis outbreak … .”247 
 
2.  Anti-Vaxxers and Measles 
 
Measles is not the deadliest of infectious diseases. Even so, “Before the 
introduction of measles vaccine in 1963 and widespread vaccination, major 
epidemics occurred approximately every 2–3 years and measles caused an 
estimated 2.6 million deaths each year.”248 World population in 1963 was a little 
over 3.211 billion people,249 meaning that roughly one out of every 1235 
individuals on the planet died from measles every year. In contrast, the rate of 
severe allergic reactions to the MMR (mumps-measles-rubella) vaccine is about 
one in 1 million doses.250 It was thus roughly 1000 times less risky to get the 
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measles vaccine than to walk around unvaccinated even in just the year of 
vaccination, let alone over a lifetime. 
That calculus has changed. Even in a bad year, measles now causes only 
about 140,000 deaths globally,251 reflecting a reduction in yearly measles deaths 
since 1963 of over 94% despite a world population that has more than doubled in 
the interim. Nevertheless, with the rare exception of a disease like smallpox that 
now exists only in laboratories, vaccination remains necessary to protect the public 
commons, as the 2000 polio recommendation suggests and—given its infection 
rate—remains particularly true for measles.  
Anti-Vaxxer resistance to measles vaccines, however, got an unfortunate 
boost from the false linking of the MMR vaccine to autism, unfortunately given 
credence “by the 1998 publication of a series of articles in The Lancet by a former 
British doctor, Andrew Wakefield..”252 “Despite the small sample size (n=12), the 
uncontrolled design, and the speculative nature of the conclusions, the paper 
received wide publicity, and MMR vaccination rates began to drop because parents 
were concerned about the risk of autism after vaccination.”253 Recent research 
indicates that the fraudulent research continues to influence parents’ decisions to 
not vaccinate their children, particularly as the internet and social media become 
increasingly popular sources of “medical” advice.254 
Thus, the regulatory baseline for MMR vaccine has illegitimately shifted, and 
expanded exemptions from state vaccination mandates played a critical role in 
allowing individual choices to once again endanger public health.255 Children (and 
others) are paying the price.  
 
E. The Resumption of Vaccine Requirements, with a Note on the 
Coronavirus Pandemic 
 
Incidents like the Lancet fraud and the low vaccination rates in some states in 
2017 illuminate how far the public’s risk perception baseline has shifted from the 
vaccine-preventable diseases to the vaccines themselves, warranting restoration of 
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lymphoid-nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in 
children, 351 LANCET 637, 637-41 (1998) (retracted by the journal for fraud in March 2010). 
253 T. S. Sathyanarayana Rao & Chittaranjan Andrade, The MMR vaccine and autism: Sensation, 
refutation, retraction, and fraud, 53 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 95, 95 (2011), doi: 10.4103/0019-
5545.82529.  
254 Lucy E Elkin, Susan R.H. Pullon, & Maria H. Stubbe, ‘Should I vaccinate my child?’ Comparing 
the displayed stances of vaccine information retrieved from Google, Facebook and YouTube, 38 
VACCINE 2772, 2771 (2020) (citations omitted), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2020.02.041; 
Benecke & DeYoung, supra note 238.  For a particularly pointed internet response to anti-vaxxer 
rhetoric, see Rada Jones, 24 reasons not to vaccinate your kid, KEVINMD.COM (Jan. 25, 2020), 
https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2020/01/24-reasons-to-not-vaccinate-your-kid.html.  
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regulatory regimes’ full strength. Fortunately, in the United States, resurgences of 
diseases thought long vanquished, like measles, have inspired governments to once 
again strengthen their vaccine programs and requirements, suggesting that disease 
resurgence is reactivating cultural memory and at least partially correcting this 
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. 
 
1. The Federal Government’s Response to Measles Resurgence 
 
Although vaccination levels in schoolchildren during the 1980s were 90% or 
higher as a result of the new school vaccination requirements, rates among 
preschool children were significantly lower.256 The result was a measles resurgence 
in 1989-1991, “primarily affecting unvaccinated preschool-aged children,”257 that 
resulted in 55,000 reported cases. In response, Congress created the Vaccines for 
Children Program258 through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.259 
The program lasted a decade, between 1994 and 2013. Under it “all Medicaid-
eligible children, all children who are uninsured, all American Indian and Alaska 
Native children, and insured children whose coverage does not include vaccinations 
(with limitations on the locations where this last group can receive VFC vaccine) 
qualify to receive routine childhood vaccines at no cost for the vaccine.”260 
In 2014, the CDC analyzed this program and concluded that it was a rousing 
success.261 Thus, the Vaccines for Children Program indicates that stepped-up 
federal financing of vaccination can be one effective corrective to Anti-Vaxxer 
sentiments. 
 
2.  The States’ Responses to Measles Resurgence 
 
Resurgences of diseases like measles have also led some states to re-think their 
exemptions from school vaccination requirements. In response to the 2014-2015 
measles outbreak, for example, several states revisited their vaccination laws. In 
2015, “Vermont became the first state to repeal its personal belief exemption,” 
followed by California, which “removed exemptions based on personal beliefs, 
which are defined in that state as also including religious objections.”262 Other 
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Natl. Conf. State Legislatures (June 26, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-
immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. See also Vaccination Exemptions, HISTORY OF VACCINES 
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states made it more difficult to claim an exemption from the vaccine 
requirements—a procedural modification that, as noted above, has been correlated 
with significantly lower rates of exemption use. For example, Connecticut 
“require[d] an annual, notarized, statement from parents or guardians specifying 
religious objection to required vaccinations,” while West Virginia amended its 
vaccine legislation to “require[] certification by a licensed physician for medical 
exemption requests,” and Illinois “require[d] parents or guardians who claim a 
religious exemption to detail their objections for specific immunizations, obtain a 
health care provider’s signature, and submit an exemption certificate for each child 
before kindergarten, sixth and ninth grade.”263  
State amendments to vaccine exemptions have continued. In 2016, both 
Michigan and Delaware revisited their school vaccine mandates, with Delaware 
weakening its religious exemption.264 In 2017, Indiana required college students 
living on campus to be immunized against meningitis, while Utah potentially 
eviscerated parental control by allowing minors to consent to their own 
vaccinations.265 
The 2019 measles outbreak again inspired states to strengthen their vaccine 
requirements, especially New York. As noted above, measles cases in 2019 
occurred in 31 states, but “75% of cases were linked to outbreaks in New York City 
and New York state, most of which were among unvaccinated children in Orthodox 
Jewish communities.”266 In response to these measles outbreaks, New York ended 
its religious exemption and other exemptions from school vaccine requirements.267  
State legislatures in Arkansas, Maine, Washington, Colorado, and Virginia also 
responded to the 2019 measles outbreaks. In fairly targeted legislation, Washington 
removed “the personal belief exemption for the measles, mumps and rubella 
vaccine requirement for public schools, private schools and day care centers..”268 
Maine, in contrast, eliminated both its religious and personal belief exemptions,269 
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although these changes do not take effect until September 2021.270 As of 2019, 
Arkansas now requires public and private schools to maintain records regarding 
vaccination exemption use; in 2020, Colorado established similar requirements and 
requires parents claiming a personal or religious exemption to complete an online 
education program first.271 Finally, in 2020 Virginia required its school vaccination 
requirements to “be consistent with the Immunization Schedule developed and 
published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and 
the American Academy of Family Physicians.”272 
Thus, over the course of six years, state legislatures significantly shifted the 
vaccine regulatory baseline back toward public protection. By January 2021, the 
number of states with a personal philosophy exemption had dropped back to 15.273 
A record five states now have no non-medical exemptions, while several others 
made use of the exemptions more difficult, including through education 
requirements.274 The cultural memory that school vaccination requirements curb 
personal impulses that put the public health at risk appears to be, for the moment, 
at least partially re-activated. 
 
3. Coronavirus Vaccines and the Anti-Vaxxers 
 
Before COVID-19 locked down the United States in March 2020, the last 
true pandemic in this country was the 1918 H1N1 flu (“Spanish flu) pandemic—
although the 2009 H1N1 flu (“swine flu”) outbreak did considerable damage.275 In 
13 months, between January 21, 2020, and February 20, 2021, the coronavirus 
pandemic had killed over 495,000 people in the United States and over 2.45 million 
worldwide276—levels approaching pre-vaccine death rates from measles. By 
February 2021, mass vaccinated against the new disease its early stages even as 
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public health workers were discovering more virulent mutations of the virus.277 
Will the vaccine regulatory baseline syndrome affect the United States’ ability to 
effectively combat the pandemic? 
Research is mixed as the Article goes to press. On the one hand, early 
studies indicate significant resistance to taking the new coronavirus vaccines, even 
among healthcare workers.278 Moreover, a 2020 report from the Centre for 
Countering Digital Hate indicated that, globally, “social media accounts held by so-
called anti-vaxxers have increased their following by at least 7-8 million people 
since 2019” and that “31 million people follow anti-vaccine groups on 
Facebook.”279 False and misleading rumors about the two approved COVID-19 
vaccines are easy to find on the internet and across social media.280 On the other, 
other studies indicate that, at least in the United States, political affiliation, 
geographic location, distrust of speedy approval processes and foreign vaccines, 
and race all appear to be relevant factors in a particular person’s reluctance to 
become vaccinated.281 As a result, as coronavirus vaccines roll out, it difficult to 
assess whether resistance reflects the more general vaccine regulatory shifting 
baseline syndrome at work, whether resistance to coronavirus vaccines is a specific 
phenomenon resulting from a particular cultural and political moment that will fade 
as 2021 and (hopefully) successful vaccination efforts progress, or a little of both. 
 
IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 
CONTROVERSY AS A REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 
 
Can the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome operate more subtly within 
statutory regimes to undermine regulatory efficacy? This Part examines the 
ongoing “waters of the United States” controversy within the federal Clean Water 
Act to suggest that the answer is “yes.” 
In 1969, two water pollution events occurred that spurred Congress to increase 
the federal involvement in water pollution control: the latest in a century-long series 
 
277 COVID-19: Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Variants, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
(updated Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/more/science-and-
research/scientific-brief-emerging-variants.html 
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accept a COVID-19 vaccine?, CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RESEARCH & POL’Y (Oct 21, 
2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/10/who-will-accept-covid-19-vaccine. 
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HEALTH [online] (Oct. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1016/S2589-7500(20)30227-2. 
280 Dennis Thompson, Anti-Vaxxers Wage Campaigns Against COVID-19 Shots, WEBMD (Jan. 29, 
2021), https://www.webmd.com/vaccines/covid-19-vaccine/news/20210129/anti-vaxxers-
mounting-internet-campaigns-against-covid-19-shots.  
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of Cuyahoga River fires,282 and the Santa Barbara oil spill from an oil drilling 
platform.283 Before that, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been relying on the 
Refuse Act284 (Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899) to punish people 
who polluted the navigable waters, but the statute was an imprecise fit given its 
larger focus on preserving navigation.285 In contrast, Congress had been addressing 
water quality since 1948 through the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, but until 
1972 those efforts focused on encouraging states to address water quality, 
eventually through setting water quality standards, providing federal money for 
sewage treatment works, and providing federal research, limiting the federal 
regulatory role to interstate waters and, in 1970, oil spills.286 In 1970, however, 
President Richard M. Nixon ordered the brand new Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps to establish a permit program under the Refuse 
Act, which the two agencies did within the year.287 
In 1972, Congress enacted the contemporary version of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, better known as the Clean Water Act, “to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”288 
The Act was ambitious, and the EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the 
two federal agencies that implement the Act, as well as states and communities 
throughout the Nation, failed to achieve the Act’s many goals on Congress’s 
original timeline—universal secondary treatment at publicly owned treatment 
works (POTWs or sewage treatment plants by 1977,289 fishable and swimmable 
waters by 1983,290 and the elimination of all discharges of pollutants by 1985.291  
Nevertheless, Congress’s focus in 1972, and what it eventually did with the 
Refuse Act permit program, are important background to the current operations of 
the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. One of the core regulatory innovations 
of the 1972 Act was to tie previously existing state water quality standards to 
federal water quality permitting requirements, in part because of growing 
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congressional concerns about the impact of water pollution—itself an abuse of the 
public commons—on public health.292 
This Part argues that the “waters of the United States” controversy can be 
helpfully reframed as an instance of the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. 
Specifically, significant progress in addressing the classic “tragedy of the 
commons” water pollution problem has allowed property interests to focus courts’ 
and regulators’ attention on other statutory provisions that allow the Act to interfere 
with private property use and states’ primacy in land use planning. In this case, 
therefore, identifying the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome in action 
illuminates an important statutory design weakness—one that Congress and the two 
agencies may simply want to eliminate rather than pursuing yet more rounds of 
definitional debate over “waters of the United States.” 
 
A. U.S. Waterways: From Open Access Resource to Regulated Commons 
 
Throughout the first two-thirds of the 20th century, rivers in the United States 
were as often sources of problems as they were amenities. These classic commons 
resources were widely viewed as free waste disposal facilities, and Hardin’s tragedy 
was often not long in manifesting itself as riverfront cities industrialized. Damage 
to the larger public good was perhaps most obvious when rivers flowing through 
and around these cities repeatedly caught fire. Most famously, the Cuyahoga River, 
which flows through Cleveland, Ohio, caught fire in 1868, 1883, 1887, 1912, 1922, 
1936, 1941, 1948, 1952, and 1969; the last first, although not the worst of the series, 
provided one direct impetus to Congress to intervene in water pollution 
regulation.293 Until the late 1950s, moreover, residents often viewed the 
Cuyahoga’s and other river’s pollution as a sign of progress, even though the 
growing water pollution problem could also affect their drinking water: 
 
The water was nearly always covered in oil slicks, and it bubbled 
like a deadly stew. Sometimes rats floated by, their corpses so 
bloated they were practically the size of dogs. It was disturbing, but 
it was also just one of the realities of the city. For more than a 
century, the Cuyahoga River had been prime real estate for various 
manufacturing companies. Everyone knew it was polluted, but 
pollution meant industry was thriving, the economy was booming, 
and everyone had jobs.294 
 
292 E.g., S. REP. NO.92-214 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3671 (Oct. 28, 1971). 
293 Boissoneault, supra note 282. 
294 Id. The Clean Water Act does not directly protect drinking water in municipal systems; instead, 
the Safe Drinking Water Act performs that function. The attribution of almost all drinking water 
improvements, and hence associated public health benefits, to this later Act has generally skewed 
cost-benefit analyses of the Clean Water Act. David A. Keiser, Catherine L. King, & Joseph S. 
Shapiro, The low but uncertain measured benefits of US water quality policy, 116 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCIS. (PNAS) 5262, 5267 (2019). However, more recent and comprehensive studies better 
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Nor was Cleveland alone in dealing with flammable rivers; “Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Buffalo and Galveston all used different methods to 
disperse oil on their waters in order to prevent fires.”295 
Slightly less visibly, rivers also functioned as the United States’ primary sewer 
system. This issue reached the U.S. Supreme Court several times in the first half of 
the 20th century, particularly when the City of Chicago decided to redirect its raw 
sewage away from Lake Michigan (the source of its drinking water) through an 
artificial canal system and into the Mississippi River. Downstream Missouri sued 
Illinois over the change, first establishing that the Supreme Court had original 
jurisdiction over interstate pollution cases296 and then seeking to shut down the 
diversion as an interstate nuisance.297 Missouri alleged that “the result of the 
threatened discharge would be to send 1,500 tons of poisonous filth daily into the 
Mississippi, to deposit great quantities of the same upon the part of the bed of the 
last named river belonging to the plaintiff, and so to poison the water of that river, 
upon which various of the plaintiff's cities, towns, and inhabitants depended, as to 
make it unfit for drinking, agricultural, or manufacturing purposes,”298 particularly 
because of an increased risk for typhoid fever.299 While there are many notable 
facets of the Supreme Court’s decision that Missouri could not meet its burden of 
proof for nuisance, most important for this discussion was the fact that essentially 
every city upstream of St Louis—not to mention St. Louis itself—was discharging 
its raw sewage into the Mississippi River, making it next to impossible to hold 
Chicago and Illinois responsible for any health impacts (which were themselves 
difficult to discern).300 
In response to a growing environmental consciousness generally, the Cuyahoga 
River fire of 1969, the Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969, and other impetuses, in 1972 
Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to create the 
fundamental structure of what is now known as the Clean Water Act.301 One of the 
 
account for the pervasive benefits of sewage treatment, which was, at least at the federal level, the 
sole domain of the Clean Water Act. See generally David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, 
Consequences of the Clean Water Act and the Demand for Water Quality, 134 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 
349 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy019 (focusing specifically on the impacts of the Act’s 
sewage treatment grants. 
295 Boissoneault, supra note 282. 
296 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248-29 (1901). 
297 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 517 (1906). 
298 Id. 
299 Id. at 522-23. 
300 Id. at 525-26. See also New Jersey v. New York, 256 U.S. 296, 313-14 (1921) (holding that New 
Jersey had not (yet) proven that New York’s discharges of raw sewage into the Passaic River were 
a nuisance). Importantly, however, the Court did protect the first municipal sewage treatment plants 
from being enjoined as nuisances themselves, even though their treatment of the raw sewage was 
substantially incomplete in many cases. City of Harrisonville, Mo. v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 
289 U.S. 334, 337-40 (1933). 
301 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388. The name “Clean Water Act” comes from the 1977 amendments. Pub. 
L. No. 95-217, § 1, 91 Stat. 1567 (Dec. 27, 1977). 
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important but less celebrated features of the statute, for example, was its grant 
program to promote the building and upgrading of sewage treatment plants across 
the country.302 The Act also limited industrial discharges of pollutants into the 
nation’s waterways through two permit programs.303 
 The Clean Water Act has worked, particularly in terms of addressing the 
commons water pollution problems that induced its drafting. In 2019, David Keiser 
and Joseph Shapiro published two of the most comprehensive analyses of the Clean 
Water Act ever done. Noting that, since 1970, the federal government has spent 
over $400 per year for every American “to clean up surface water pollution and 
provide clean drinking water,”304 they concluded that “many measures of drinking 
and surface water pollution have fallen since the founding of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, due at least in part to the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act,” although progress remains incomplete.305 Specifically, after analyzing 
14.6 million pollution measurements taken at 265,000 monitoring sites between 
1972 and 2014, Keiser & Shapiro concluded that “[w]hen the Clean Water Act 
passed in 1972, nearly 30 percent of water quality readings were unsafe for fishing,” 
while “by 2014, only about 15 percent were unsafe.”306 Grants to upgrade sewage 
treatment plants and enforcement of the Act’s National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements (see below) were particularly 
important in reducing water pollution.307 More anecdotal evidence also indicates 
that the Clean Water Act is still working to make progress in this main mission: In 
March 2019, Cuyahoga River fish were deemed safe to eat, and the river hasn’t 





302 Pub. L. No.  92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (Oct. 18, 1972), codified as amended as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1388. 
303 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344; see discussion infra subpart IV.B. 
304 David A. Keiser & Joseph S. Shapiro, US Water Pollution Regulation over the Past Half Century: 
Burning Waters to Crystal Springs?, 33 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 52 (2019). The Clean Water Act 
accounts for about $100 per year of that total. Keiser & Shapiro, Consequences, supra note 294, at 
349. 
305 Keiser & Shapiro Pollution Regulation, supra note 304, at 53. 
306 Id. at 60. 
307 Id. See also Keiser & Shapiro, Consequences, supra note 294, at 352 (“We find that each grant 
decreases the probability that downriver areas violate standards for being fishable by half a 
percentage point. These changes are concentrated within 25 miles downstream of the treatment plant 
and they persist for 30 years.”), 373 (“We find large declines in most pollutants that the Clean Water 
Act targeted. Dissolved oxygen deficits and the share of waters that are not fishable both decreased 
almost every year between 1962 and 1990.”), 374 (“The share of waters that are not fishable fell on 
average by about half a percentage point per year, and the share that are not swimmable fell at a 
similar rate.”). Notably, because federal sewage treatment grants began before the 1972 
amendments, there were often more declines in sewage pollution before 1972 than after it. Id. at 
374. 
308 Boissoneault, supra note 282. 












2021 REGULATORY SHIFTING BASELINE SYNDROME 53 
B. Structuring the Clean Water Act’s Permit Programs 
 
Water quality regulation in the United States has always been complicated by 
the fact that certain water polluting activities, traditionally the states’ prerogative, 
can also interfere with navigation, most emphatically the federal government’s 
domain. Thus, by the time Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act in 1972, the Army Corps for decades had been regulating dredging and 
filling of the navigable waters pursuant to Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act 
of 1899309 as a navigation issue. Rivers that can catch on fire are also navigation 
issues, and, as noted, when Congress overhauled the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act in 1972, the EPA and Army Corps had been operating a Refuse Act 
permit program for pollution for almost two years.310  
Already, however, Congress was unimpressed. Senate Bill 2770 provided the 
initial text of the 1972 amendments. As the Senate Committee on Public Works 
noted in October 1971 in its initial report on that bill,  
 
While the permit program created in late 1970 under the Refuse 
Act by the Administrator seeks to establish this direct approach, it 
is weak in two important respects: It is being applied only to 
industrial polluters, and authority is divided between two Federal 
agencies. 
Experience with the permit system during the past 10 months 
suggests that the machinery used to date may be as cumbersome as 
the 1948 abatement procedure. Estimates of the number of permit 
applications to be received run as high as 300,000; estimates of the 
time required to process the applications run as long as four years.311 
 
The Senate Committee proposed a single permit program, run by the EPA until 
each state could take it over, with permits containing enforceable effluent 
limitations.312 Water quality standards would now serve as the metrics of progress 
toward achieving water quality goals.313 The Senate bill would have converted 
Refuse Act permits to NPDES permits,314 and the new NPDES permit requirement 
would also apply to the “at least 40,000” industrial dischargers that the EPA had 
identified.315 However, unlike under the Refuse Act, states would take over the 
NPDES permit program as they developed the capacity to do so, with federal 
oversight of their implementation.316 Most important for this Article, under the 
 
309 33 U.S.C. § 403. 
310 CRAIG, supra note 284, at 21-22. 
311 S. REP. NO.92-214 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3672 (Oct. 28, 1971). 
312 Id. at 3675-76. 
313 Id. at 3675-76. 
314 Id. at 3735. 
315 Id. at 3736. 
316 Id, at 3737-38. 
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Senate’s original vision, the NPDES permit program would also largely displace 
Army Corps “dredge and fill” permits under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act.317  
 Drafting wrangling with the House of Representatives, however, led to a 
different final compromise. Under Section 402 of the new Act, Refuse Act permits 
would still become NPDES permits, and the EPA could eventually delegate 
NPDES permitting authority to the states—albeit with several new state 
requirements and expanded EPA oversight, including veto authority.318 The House, 
however, had inserted a new Section 404 permit program, “for the discharge of 
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters.”319 The conference amendment 
added new roles for the EPA in this permit program, including giving the EPA 
“authority to prohibit specification of a site and use of any site for the disposal of 
any dredge or fill material which he determines will adversely affect municipal 
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding 
areas), wildlife, or recreational areas.”320 As under the Rivers and Harbors Act, 
however, the focus of the Section 404 permit program remained (at least in 
Congress’s view) preserving navigation, and the Conference Committee “expected 
that … unreasonable restrictions shall not be imposed on dredging activities 
essential to the maintenance of interstate and foreign commerce.”321 
As a result, the Clean Water Act emerged from Congress with two permit 
programs, which have remained in force for almost 50 years. However, the same 
regulatory prohibition triggers both: except in compliance with the Clean Water 
Act’ requirements, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be 
unlawful.”322 The Act defines “the discharge of a pollutant” to be “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source,”323 where “navigable waters” 
are “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”324 The Act defines 
“territorial seas” to be the first three miles of ocean,325 but it leaves “the waters of 
the United States” undefined. Interpreting “waters of the United States” “has led to 
legal debates over how this term applies to roughly half of US waters, primarily 
composed of wetlands, headwaters, and intermittent streams.”326 This interpretive 
tension vibrates across the two permit programs, with an emphasis on traditional 
“navigable waters” making more sense for the Army Corps under section 404, but 
a broader interpretation of “waters of the United States” better serving the EPA’s 
and Congress’s broader water quality goals in the NPDES program. 
 
317 Id. at 3751-52. 
318 S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3816-18 (Sept. 28, 1972). 
319 Id. at 3818-19. 
320 Id. at 3820. 
321 Id. at 3819. 
322 33 U.S.C. §1311(a). 
323 Id. § 1362(12). 
324 Id. § 1362(7). 
325 Id. § 1362(8). 
326 Keiser & Shapiro, Pollution Regulation, supra note 304, at 57-58. 
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The distinction between the two permit programs lies in exactly what pollutant 
the polluter is discharging. If it is dredged or fill material, the polluter is subject to 
the Section 404 permit program, which the Army Corps takes lead in 
implementing.327 All other dischargers get NPDES permits.328  
As the next subpart discusses, the focus of attention between these two permit 
programs has shifted over time, and, notably, the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
problematizing the scope of “waters of the United States” have come in the context 
of Section 404 and were decided since 2000, well into the second half of the Act’s 
existence. The shift in focus from NPDEs permits to Section 404 permits, not 
coincidentally, has allowed the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome to come into 
play. 
 
C. From NPDES to Section 404: The Consequences of Shifting Regulatory 
Attention 
 
1. Overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Clean Water Act Decisions 
 
Congress’s decision to use the same legal test to trigger both permit programs 
is the Clean Water Act’s amnesia-inducing structural feature, because the two 
regulatory regimes otherwise resonate in very different webs of rights and values. 
As with the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements, the shifting baseline 
syndrome is most obvious in Supreme Court opinions. Specifically, when 
evaluating “waters of the United States” from inside the Section 404 web, the Court 
forgets that what it says that permitting context will simultaneously affect how the 
NPDES permit program can operate. 
As the Senate Committee originally noted, the primary focus of the 1972 
amendments was effectively regulating the 40,000 (at least) industrial dischargers 
that the EPA had discovered—the NPDES permit program—rather than on the 
Army Corps’ continued oversight of the dredging and filling necessary to preserve 
navigation. And, indeed, the EPA and the courts spent a considerable amount of 
energy in the first half of the Clean Water Act’s existence, from roughly 1972 to 
1997, getting the NPDES permit program up and running.  
Nevertheless, the historical progression of U.S. Supreme Court’s limited pool 
of decisions about the Clean Water Act suggests a significant shift in regulatory 
focus over time. As Table 1 indicates, ten of the Court’s 17 decisions focused on 
the Act’s NPDES permit program (almost 60%) occurred in the first half of the 
Act’s existence. In contrast, of the Court’s six decisions focused on Section 404, 
five (more than 83%) have occurred since 1997. The number increases to six out of 
seven decisions (almost 86%) if one considers Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Southeast 
Alaska Conservation Council329 (2009) to be primarily a Section 404 decision. 
 
327 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
328 Id. § 1342(a). 
329 557 U.S. 261 (2009). 
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In addition to shifting focus to the Section 404 context, the Court’s decisions 
regarding the two permit programs are often qualitatively different in how they 
approach the Clean Water Act. Some of these differences are evident in the permit 
programs themselves. For example, in Coeur Alaska, the Court had to decide which 
permit program applied to Coeur Alaska’s discharge of a mine tailings slurry from 
its Kensington Gold Mine into Slate Lake.330 “Over the life of the mine, Coeur 
Alaska intend[ed] to put 4.5 million tons of tailings in the lake”331 at a rate of 
210,000 gallons per day, effectively destroying the lake for the duration of the mine 
and “kill[ing] all of the lake’s fish and nearly all of its other aquatic life.”332 This 
result was perfectly legal under the Section 404 permit program, so long as Coeur 
Alaska restored the lake at the end of the process and kept it isolated from other 
waters in the interim—and, the Army Corps concluded, using Slate Lake this way 
was better for the environment than disposing of the tailings in nearby wetlands.333 
Under the NPDES program, in contrast, the discharge was completely illegal under 
the EPA’s effluent limitations for the froth-floatation gold mining industry.334 The 
Court’s six-Justice majority accorded Chevron deference to the Army Corps’ and 
EPA’s decision that the Section 404 program applied because Coeur Alaska was 
“filling” Slate Lake.335 Among other things, this decision makes clear that the Army 
Corps’ founding instruction to promote commercial activity continues to conflict 
with the EPA’s ca to protect the nation’s waters. 
 
2. The Supreme Court’s View of the NPDES Permit Program: Protect the 
Public Commons 
 
NPDES permits address classic water pollution by imposing “end of the pipe” 
limitations (the effluent limitations) on how much or what concentration of 
pollutants the polluter can discharge into the waterway,336 generally based on the 
control technologies available to the polluter’s industrial category. As such, 
NPDES permits condition how businesses can operate but, usually, not whether 
they can exist. Moreover, the public benefits of the program are almost always easy 
to explain. Navigable waterbodies have long been deemed a public resource that 
should support navigation and fishing, and even privately owned smaller streams 
flow into larger waters, making the externalities and public harms of traditional 
 
330 557 U.S. 261, 267 (2009). 
331 Id. at 268. 
332 Id. at 297 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
333 Id. at 269-70. Forbidding the mine from damaging either water of the United States apparently 
never occurred to the Army Corps. 
334 Id. at 278-79 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b), 40 C.F.R. § 440.104(b)(1)). 
335 Id. at 275, 277, 290-91. Along the way, the Court also deferred to the agencies’ conclusion that 
the permit programs are mutually exclusive: any specific discharge is subject to one or the other, 
but not both. Id. at 274-75. 
336 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) 
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water pollution fairly obvious even for these smaller waters. NPDES regulation 
thus resonates strongly with common-law nuisance constraints on private action.337 
In this regulatory context, the Supreme Court has long read the Act broadly to 
effectuate Congress’s goal of reducing water pollution and to strengthen the EPA’s 
authority to make progress toward that goal. For example, one of the Court’s 
earliest NPDES decisions, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v, Train (1977), 
emphasized that “[t]he statute, enacted on October 18, 1972, authorized a series of 
steps to be taken to achieve the goal of eliminating all discharges of pollutants into 
the Nation’s waters by 1985 … .”338 The issue was whether the EPA had authority 
under the Act to issue industry-wide effluent limitations by regulation, as opposed 
to setting facility-specific effluent limitations in the process of writing each 
discharger’s permit.339 In upholding the EPA’s authority based on both the statutory 
language and the legislative history,340 the Court also elaborated upon the 
impediment that du Pont’s approach would pose to improving water quality: 
 
The petitioners’ view of the Act would place an impossible burden 
on EPA. It would require EPA to give individual consideration to 
the circumstances of each of the more than 42,000 dischargers who 
have applied for permits, . . . and to issue or approve all these permits 
well in advance of the 1977 deadline in order to give industry time 
to install the necessary pollution-control equipment. We do not 
believe that Congress would have failed so conspicuously to provide 
EPA with the authority needed to achieve the statutory goals.341 
 
Similarly, in EPA v. National Crushed Stone Association (1980), the Court upheld 
the EPA’s decision not to allow variances from the first phase of effluent limitations 
just because the discharger could not afford the “best practicable technology.”342 
“Necessarily, if pollution is to be diminished, limitations based on BPT must forbid 
the level of effluent produced by the most pollution-prone segment of the industry, 
that segment not measuring up to ‘the average of the best existing performance.’ 
So understood, the statute contemplated regulations that would require a substantial 
 
337 Indeed, “In 1998, a Washington State court found that even lawful operation of a business—a 
pulp mill operating with a Federal Water Pollution Control Act national pollution discharge 
elimination system (NPDES) permit allowing it to discharge treated process wastewater into the 
Columbia River—could support an award of $2.5 million in damages for nuisance to potato farmers 
drawing irrigation water from the aquifer contaminated by the defendant’s operation.” Denise 
Antolini & Clifford L. Rechtschaffen, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10114, 10119 (2008) (citing Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 883 (Wash. 1998)).  
338 430 U.S. 112, 116 (1977). 
339 Id. at 125-26. 
340 Id. at 129-32. 
341 Id. at 132-33. 
342 449 U.S. 64, 83-84 (1980). 
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number of point sources with the poorest performances either to conform to BPT 
standards or to cease production.”343 
This trend continues into the Court’s most recent NPDES decision, County of 
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund (2020), where the Court once again emphasized the 
Act’s purpose to clean up the nation’s waterways.344 At issue was a sewage 
treatment plant located north of Lahaina on the island of Maui, Hawai’i, and the 
Court majority stressed the water quality problem that it was causing: “The facility 
collects sewage from the surrounding area, partially treats it, and pumps the treated 
water through four wells hundreds of feet underground. This effluent, amounting 
to about 4 million gallons each day, then travels a further half mile or so, through 
groundwater, to the ocean.”345 The issue was whether this conveyance through 
groundwater constituted a discharge “from a point source” into the Pacific Ocean 
that triggered the Act.346 The Court sought to find a middle ground between a broad 
reading that would essentially require a permit regardless of how convoluted the 
links between the discharger and the receiving “water of the United States” actually 
were347 and a narrow reading that would create a “large and obvious loophole” in 
the NPDES program any time pollutants passed through groundwater on their way 
to a surface water body.348 As a result, the Court concluded that the facility could 
be subject to the NPDES permit program if the injection was the “functional 
equivalent of a direct discharge.”349  
To be sure, some of the Court’s recent decisions also constrain the NPDES 
program’s reach. However, these decisions tend to turn on complications other than 
the Court’s own construction of the Act. For example, in Los Angeles County Flood 
Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council (2013), the problem was a 
badly framed issue on certiorari that turned a complex issue about Los Angeles 
County’s ultimate responsibility for meeting water quality standards into an overly 
simplistic issue of whether a discharge occurs when water flows from a channelized 
portion of the Los Angeles River into a more natural portion;350 prior caselaw made 
it clear that the answer was “no.”351 Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense 
Center (2013), in turn, turned on the Court giving Auer deference to the EPA’s 
counterintuitive interpretation of its own regulation to conclude that logging roads 
are not subject to the NPDES program’s stormwater requirements,352 an issue that 
 
343 Id. at 76. 
344 --- U.S. ---, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468, (2020) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). 
345 Id. at 1469. 
346 Id. at 1470. 
347 Id. at 1470-73. 
348 Id. at 1473 (citations omitted). 
349 Id. at 1476. 
350 568 U.S. 78, 80 (2013). 
351 Id. at 82-84. Notably, the Court’s decision was only six pages long. 
352 568 U.S. 597, 612-14 (2013). 
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put the NPDES program’s goal and the EPA’s authority to administer that program 
squarely in conflict.353 
 
3. The Supreme Court’s View of “Waters of the United States” through the 
Section 404 Permit Program: Protect State Prerogatives and Private 
Property Rights 
 
The Section 404 permit program has moved far beyond Congress’s 1972 vision 
of dredging and filling to maintain navigation. Consistent with Congress’s view 
that Section 404 permits were mostly about navigation, the Army Corps’ 
regulations originally restricted “waters of the United States” to the traditionally 
navigable waters.354 However, because the EPA eventually forced the Army Corps 
to define “waters of the United States” to the limits of the Commerce Clause,355 
Section 404 now requires permits for the dredging and filling of some subset of 
smaller waters, including wetlands and small and intermittent streams. People who 
now qualify for the Section 404 permit program are often ditching and/or filling the 
soggier parts of their property before building something. Unlike NPDES permits, 
therefore, Section 404 permits can and often do directly interfere with the 
development of private property, particularly larger development projects.356 It is 
no accident, in other words, that almost all constitutional takings litigation that the 
Clean Water Act has generated comes out of the Section 404 permitting program.357 
Moreover, wrangling over what uses can and cannot occur on private property 
means that the Army Corps makes decisions in Section 404 permits that can look a 
lot like land use planning, a traditional area of state authority.358  
 
353 See also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208. 217-27 (2009) (according Chevron 
deference to the EPA’s decision to use cost-benefit analysis to determine the level of technological 
stringency required for power plant cooling water intake structures, even though the standards 
chosen were not the most protective of aquatic life). 
354 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985). 
355 See id. at 123-24 (recounting this history and citing 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 1975). 
356 E.g.. Forest Properties, Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that 
the denial of the Section 404 permit ended development of cabins on a lakebed); Florida Rock 
Industries v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 164 (1990) (noting that a denial of a Section 404 permit 
prevented a limestone mine from operating). 
357 E.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126-29 (discounting the seriousness of the taking 
issue as “spurious constitutional overtones”); Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1300 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (asserting a takings claim based on the Army Corps’ denial of a Section 404 permit); 
Forest Properties, Inc. 177 F.3d at 1364 (asserting a regulatory takings claim on the basis of a 
Section 404 permit denial); City National Bank of Miami v, United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 759 (1995) 
(takings claim occasioned by denial of Section 404 permit). A corresponding Westlaw search for 
takings claims in connection with the NPDEs program revealed no reported decisions. 
358 E.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126 (virtually equating Section 404 permits with 
land use planning); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (“Regulation of land use, 
as through the issuance of the development permits sought by petitioners in both of these cases, is a 
quintessential state and local power.” (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767–768, n. 30 
(1982); Hess v. Port Authority Trans–Hudson Corporation, 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994))). 
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Thus, litigation over the Section 404 permit program has shifted the Court’s 
attention away from improving water quality and safeguarding the EPA’s authority 
to protecting private property rights and states’ traditional authorities. In the 
process, this litigation has also focused on the scope of “waters of the United 
States,” eventually creating a definitional mess that now limits the NPDES 
program, as well. 
Indeed, in the Supreme Court, the controversy over the proper definition of 
“waters of the United States” has played out entirely in the Section 404 context. 
The first decision, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (1985),359 felt 
much like the NPDES decisions: the Court unanimously held that the Army Corps 
can regulate the dredging and filling of wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable 
bodies of water, in order to fulfill the Act’s water quality goals.360 The defendant, 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., owned 80 acres of low-lying, marshy land near 
the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb County, Michigan. In 1976, it began to fill 
these wetlands to build a housing development. Giving Chevron deference to the 
Army Corps’ regulations interpreting “waters of the United States,” the Riverside 
Bayview Court concluded that applying the Clean Water Act to “adjacent wetlands” 
made sense, because “the evident breadth of congressional concern for protection 
of water quality and aquatic ecosystems suggests that it is reasonable for the Corps 
to interpret the term ‘waters’ to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as more 
conventionally defined.”361 Moreover, the Court conceived of “waters of the United 
States” as significantly broader than the traditional navigable waters: 
 
Congress chose to define the waters covered by the Act broadly. 
Although the Act prohibits discharges into “navigable waters,” … 
the Act’s definition of “navigable waters” as “the waters of the 
United States” makes it clear that the term “navigable” as used in 
the Act is of limited import. In adopting this definition of “navigable 
waters,” Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had 
been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control 
statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” 
under the classical understanding of that term.362 
 
Nevertheless, in a footnote, the Riverside Bayview Court also specified that “[w]e 
are not called upon to address the question of the authority of the Corps to regulate 
discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water 
… and we do not express any opinion on that question.”363  
 
359 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
360 Id. at 132-33. 
361 Id. at 130–31. 
362 Id. at 133 (citations to statute omitted). 
363 Id. at 131–32 n.8. The Court’s 2002 decision in Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers also technically upheld Section 404 jurisdiction over “deep ripping” of wetlands at a 
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In 1986, the Army Corps revised its regulations. In the preamble to those 
revisions—but not in the regulations themselves—the Corps noted that it would 
assert Clean Water Act jurisdiction over any intrastate waters: 
 
(i) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by 
Migratory Bird Treaties; or 
(ii) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds 
which cross state lines; or 
(iii) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species; 
or 
(iv) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.364 
 
These non-regulatory assertions of jurisdiction became known, collectively, as the 
“Migratory Bird Rule.” The Migratory Bird Rule led directly to the Supreme 
Court’s 2001 decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers,365 better known as SWANCC. SWANCC involved an 
abandoned sand and gravel mining site that 23 cities and villages in suburban 
Chicago wanted to convert to a sanitary landfill. Several of the abandoned gravel 
pits had filled with water, and, while the Army Corps did not consider them 
wetlands, over 121 species of birds used the ponds, including migratory birds.366 
The Army Corps asserted jurisdiction over the site on the basis of the Migratory 
Bird Rule and denied SWANCC a Section 404 permit to fill the ponds.367 When 
SWANCC appealed, the Supreme Court held, 5–4, that the Army Corps and EPA 
could not use the Migratory Bird Rule to regulate intrastate, isolated waters.368 
Along the way, moreover, the majority emphasized that: 
 
We cannot agree that Congress’ separate definitional use of the 
phrase “waters of the United States” constitutes a basis for reading 
the term “navigable waters” out of the statute. … The term 
“navigable” has at least the import of showing us what Congress had 
in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA: its traditional 
jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or 
which could reasonably be so made.369  
 
vineyard, but the 4-4 split among the Justices merely affirmed the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the 
Ninth Circuit as a default, and the entire opinion consists of two sentences: “The judgment is 
affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice KENNEDY took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case.” 537 U.S. 99, 100 (2002). 
364 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 
(Nov. 13, 1986) 
365 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
366 Id. at 164-65. 
367 Id. at 165. 
368 Id. at 174. 
369 Id. at 171-72 (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407–408 
(1940)). 
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The SWANCC majority also refused to defer to the Army Corps’ regulatory 
definition of “waters of the United States.”370 It emphasized, for example, that 
“Congress chose to ‘recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities 
and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the 
development and use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of 
land and water resources … .’”371 The Army Corps’ regulations raised “significant 
constitutional questions” of federalism, and allowing the agency “to claim federal 
jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird Rule’ 
would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary 
power over land and water use.”372 
Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the five-Justice majority did not 
even acknowledge the NPDES program. Perhaps more surprisingly, Justice 
Stevens’ opinion for the dissenters is similarly myopic. It does start with a broad 
vision of the Act, noting that “[a]lthough Congress’ vision of zero pollution remains 
unfulfilled, its pursuit has unquestionably retarded the destruction of the aquatic 
environment. Our Nation's waters no longer burn. Today, however, the Court takes 
an unfortunate step that needlessly weakens our principal safeguard against toxic 
water.”373 From there, however, the dissenters focus exclusively on Section 404, 
including its differences from the Rivers and Harbors Act,374 why the Army Corps 
changed its mind about the scope of “waters of the United States,”375 and how 
Section 404 does indeed respect state authority376 and does not infringe upon the 
Commerce Clause’s scope.377 Caught up in the property and federalism drama of 
Section 404, the Court apparently simply forgot about the implications of its 
decision for the NPDES program. 
Rapanos v. United States (2006)378 fractured the Supreme Court, and there has 
been no national unity regarding “waters of the United States” ever since. As the 
plurality of four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, described the facts, John 
Rapanos backfilled wetlands to develop a parcel of private property in Michigan 
that “included 54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions,” although 
“[t]he nearest navigable water was 11 to 20 miles away.”379 From there, the 
plurality opinion is a rant against the Army Corp’s intrusion into private property 
rights and state land use planning, worth reproducing fully: 
 
370 Id. at 168 (noting that “the Corps’ original interpretation of the CWA, promulgated two years 
after its enactment, is inconsistent with that which it espouses here”), 172 (explicitly refusing to 
extend Chevron deference). 
371 Id. at 166-67 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). 
372 Id. at 174. 
373 Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
374 Id. at 179-182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
375 Id. at 183-191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
376 Id. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
377 Id. at 192-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
378 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
379 Id. at 719-21. 
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The burden of federal regulation on those who would deposit fill 
material in locations denominated “waters of the United States” is 
not trivial. In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an 
enlightened despot, relying on such factors as “economics,” 
“aesthetics,” “recreation,” and “in general, the needs and welfare of 
the people,” 33 CFR § 320.4(a) (2004). The average applicant for 
an individual permit spends 788 days and $271,596 in completing 
the process, and the average applicant for a nationwide permit 
spends 313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or 
design changes. … “[O]ver $1.7 billion is spent each year by the 
private and public sectors obtaining wetlands permits.” These costs 
cannot be avoided, because the Clean Water Act “impose[s] 
criminal liability,” as well as steep civil fines, “on a broad range of 
ordinary industrial and commercial activities.” … In this litigation, 
for example, for backfilling his own wet fields, Mr. Rapanos faced 
63 months in prison and hundreds of thousands of dollars in criminal 
and civil fines. 
The enforcement proceedings against Mr. Rapanos are a small 
part of the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that 
has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any change in the 
governing statute—during the past five Presidential administrations. 
In the last three decades, the Corps and the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) have interpreted their jurisdiction over 
“the waters of the United States” to cover 270–to–300 million acres 
of swampy lands in the United States—including half of Alaska and 
an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And that was 
just the beginning. The Corps has also asserted jurisdiction over 
virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit—
whether man-made or natural, broad or narrow, permanent or 
ephemeral—through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally 
or intermittently flow. On this view, the federally regulated “waters 
of the United States” include storm drains, roadside ditches, ripples 
of sand in the desert that may contain water once a year, and lands 
that are covered by floodwaters once every 100 years. Because they 
include the land containing storm sewers and desert washes, the 
statutory “waters of the United States” engulf entire cities and 
immense arid wastelands. In fact, the entire land area of the United 
States lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible 
channels furrows the entire surface, containing water ephemerally 
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wherever the rain falls. Any plot of land containing such a channel 
may potentially be regulated as a “water of the United States.”380 
 
Moreover, “[t]he extensive federal jurisdiction urged by the Government would 
authorize the Corps to function as a de facto regulator of immense stretches of 
intrastate land—an authority the agency has shown its willingness to exercise with 
the scope of discretion that would befit a local zoning board.”381  
To correct this unwarranted and possibly unconstitutional expansion of federal 
power, the plurality focused on the meaning of “waters,” concluding that: 
 
“the waters of the United States” include only relatively permanent, 
standing or flowing bodies of water. The definition refers to water 
as found in “streams,” “oceans,” “rivers,” “lakes,” and “bodies” of 
water “forming geographical features.” All of these terms connote 
continuously present, fixed bodies of water, as opposed to ordinarily 
dry channels through which water occasionally or intermittently 
flows. Even the least substantial of the definition’s terms, namely, 
“streams,” connotes a continuous flow of water in a permanent 
channel—especially when used in company with other terms such 
as “rivers,” “lakes,” and “oceans.” None of these terms encompasses 
transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of water.382 
 
This time, however, the federal government and various amici put the NPDES 
problem squarely in front of the Court, arguing that the plurality’s interpretation 
would allow polluters to evade the NPDES permit requirement, as well.383 The 
plurality disagreed, arguing that NPDEs discharges to not have to reach “waters of 
the United States directly, “that the discharge into intermittent channels of any 
pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if the 
pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters, 
but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between,” and that the intermittent conveyances 
might themselves qualify as point sources.384 In this respect, the plurality 
concluded, there were important differences between dredged and fill material and 
other pollutants: 
 
In contrast to the pollutants normally covered by the [NPDES] 
permitting requirement of § 1342(a), “dredged or fill material,” 
which is typically deposited for the sole purpose of staying put, does 
not normally wash downstream, and thus does not normally 
 
380 Id. at 721-22 (citations omitted). 
381 Id. at 738. 
382 Id. at 732-33. 
383 Id. at 742-43. 
384 Id. at 743-44. 
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constitute an “addition ... to navigable waters” when deposited in 
upstream isolated wetlands. … It does not appear, therefore, that the 
interpretation we adopt today significantly reduces the scope of § 
1342.385 
 
One can speculate whether the plurality Justices had ever actually observed 
dredging and filling operations.386 Nevertheless, regardless of how one judges the 
sincerity of their attempt to distinguish the NPDES program, it is clear that concerns 
about the NPDES program were not going to alter their decision to constrain 
Section 404. These Justices’ regulatory focus had thus shifted decisively from 
promoting continued progress in reducing water pollution to reining in Section 
404’s alleged overreaching. 
Neither Justice Kennedy in concurrence nor the dissenters agreed that the 
plurality had arrived at the correct test for “waters of the United States.” Justice 
Kennedy harkened back to Riverside Bayview to emphasize hydrological 
connectivity, and under his test “the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends 
upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and 
navigable waters in the traditional sense.”387 Moreover, “wetlands possess the 
requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the 
wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered 
waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”388 The four dissenting Justices, in 
an opinion by Justice Stevens, would have maintained broad jurisdiction over 
wetlands and other waters but—recognizing that lower courts now had two other 
tests to decide between—concluded that a “water of the United States” existed if 
either the plurality’s or Justice Kennedy’s test was met.389 
Since Rapanos, there has been no agreement what to do about the definition of 
“waters of the United States.” Proposed amendments in Congress failed,390 and the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals maintain a circuit split over whether to use the dissenter’s 
“either/or” approach or whether Justice Kennedy’s test controls; none use only the 
plurality test.391 Each of the Obama and Trump Administrations promulgated 
“waters of the United States” regulations that were promptly challenged in multiple 
courts,392 and at one point in 2020, both sets of regulations, as well as the EPA’s 
 
385 Id. at 744-45. 
386 Notably, both Justice Kennedy and the dissenters questioned the factual accuracy of the 
plurality’s assertion that dredged and fill material stays in place. Id. at 774-75 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), 806-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
387 Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
388 Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
389 Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
390 ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN CONTEXT: CASES AND MATERIALS XX (5th ed. 
forthcoming 2021). 
391 Id. at XX. 
392 For a summary of the reactions to the 2015 Obama Administration Clean Water Rule, see Dave 
Owens, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2-3. 
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and Army Corps’ pre-Rapanos regulations, were being challenged in litigation, 
with confusion and cross-injunctions escalating to the point where not even the 
EPA was sure which regulations applied in New Mexico.393 It is expected that the 
Biden Administration will formally withdraw the Trump Administration’s 
regulations and return for a time to the post-Rapanos circuit split before proposing 
new “waters of the United States” regulations of its own.394 Inevitably, regardless 
of what they say, court challenges will follow. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has continued to pursue a pro-property owner 
agenda in cases involving Section 404. Both Sackett v. Environmental Protection 
Agency (2012)395 and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co. (2016)396 
involved the right of property owners to immediately challenge the Army Corps’ 
and EPA’s determinations that the Clean Water Act applies to wetlands and other 
waters on their properties. In Sackett, the Sacketts filled in part of their Idaho lot in 
order to build a house, only to receive an EPA compliance order concluding that 
they were filling jurisdictional wetlands and requiring them to restore the 
property.397 The Court unanimously concluded that the compliance order was “final 
agency action” subject to immediate judicial review.398  Justice Alito concurred to 
emphasize that “[t]he position taken in this case by the Federal Government—a 
position that the Court now squarely rejects—would have put the property rights of 
ordinary Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) employees.”399 
In Hawkes, Hawkes Co. was engaged in mining peat from bogs that the Army 
Corps concluded were subject to the Clean Water Act, and Hawkes Co. wanted to 
challenge that determination before actually going through the permitting process. 
All nine Justices again concurred that an Army Corps jurisdictional determination 
is “final agency action”400 subject to judicial review. However, for Chief Justice 
Roberts—in an opinion eight Justices joined in full—the stakes in the Section 404 
context were particularly high and worth laying out in detail, and he quoted at 
length the plurality opinion in Rapanos regarding the costs and extensive 
jurisdiction of Section 404 permits.401 Together, therefore, Sackett and Hawkes 
evidence a clear Supreme Court determination to ensure that private property 
 
393 CRAIG, ELIC, supra note 390 at XX; see also Congressional Research Service, Evolution of the 
Meaning of “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act 23-32. 33 fig. 2 (updated March 
5, 2019), available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44585 (summarizing the 
litigation and providing a map of which rules applied where as of 2019). 
394 E.g., Bobby Magill, Biden Swings Waters Pendulum With Final Resolution Still Elusive, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Jan. 29, 2021, 3:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/environment-and-
energy/biden-swings-waters-pendulum-with-final-resolution-still-elusive. 
395 566 U.S. 120 (2012). 
396 --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016). 
397 Sackett, 566 U.S. at 123-25. 
398 Id. at 131. 
399 Id. at 132 (Alito, J., concurring). 
400 Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. at 1816, 1817-18 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
401 Id. at 1811-12. 
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owners can have their day in court before the Clean Water Act can limit how they 
develop their land. 
 
D. What Lessons Does the Regulatory Shifting Baseline Syndrome Offer for 
the Clean Water Act? 
 
As the Congressional Research Service recognized in 2019, “During the first 
two decades after the passage of the Clean Water Act, courts generally interpreted 
the act as having a wide jurisdictional reach.”402  During this 20-year period, the 
Supreme Court focused exclusively on the NPDES program, generally upholding 
the EPA’s authority “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” The EPA and the courts got the NPDES program 
up and running, and Congress has not changed that program significantly since the 
1987 amendments that required permits for municipal and industrial stormwater 
discharges.403 
It worked. Rivers no longer burn and, for the most part, cities no longer 
discharge raw sewage into the nation’s waterways.404 Water quality nationwide has 
gotten better.405 Supreme Court attention has shifted to Section 404, and it “has 
emphasized that ‘the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, 
though broad, is not unlimited.’”406 
Regardless of what the Rapanos plurality may have intended, the Rapanos 
problematization of “waters of the United States” spilled into the NPDES context, 
absolving multiple polluters of the obligation to get a Clean Water Act permit.407 
Thus, in shifting the relevant regulatory baseline from NPDES program’s control 
over paradigmatic municipal and industrial dischargers to Section 404’s impact on 
private landowners and state land use planning federalism prerogatives, a majority 
of Justices are in fact suffering from a form of the regulatory shifting baseline 
syndrome—a discounting of the danger to continuing progress in improving the 
 
402 Congressional Research Service, Evolution of the Meaning of “Waters of the United States” in 
the Clean Water Act 1 (updated March 5, 2019), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44585. 
403 Pub. L. No. 100-4, §§ 401-405, 101 Stat. 65-69 (Feb. 4, 1987). 
404 As of 2017, an estimated 14,748 POTWs served approximately 81% of U.S. households; most 
of the rest relied on septic tanks. U.S. Wastewater Treatment Fact Sheet, CTR. SUSTAINABLE 
SYSTEMS, UNIV. MICHIGAN (2017), http://css.umich.edu/factsheets/us-wastewater-treatment-
factsheet. However, wet weather events can still cause problems for sewage systems. Sanitary Sewer 
Overflows, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (updated Aug. 14, 2020), 
https://www.epa.gov/npdes/sanitary-sewer-overflows-ssos. 
405 See generally Keiser & Shapiro, Consequences, supra note 294 
406 Congressional Research Service, supra note 402, at 1. 
407 E.g., Black Warrior River-Keeper, Inc. v. Drummond Co., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1271, 1289 (N.D. 
Ala. 2019); Environmental Protection Information Center v. Pacific Lumber Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 
803, 822 (N.D. Cal. 2007); In re: Arizona Public Service Co., 2020 WL 6255456, at *17-*18 (EPA 
EAB Sept. 30, 2020). 
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nation’s water quality resulting from the fact that Section 404 raises completely 
different issues. 
Here, however, there is no single restorative solution. Instead, the dramatic 
differences in Supreme Court views of the Clean Water Act’s breadth depending 
on permit context illuminates a structural weakness in the Act overall: Despite the 
fact that Congress initially conceived the two permit programs as performing very 
different functions, it yoked them together interpretatively through a single 
statutory trigger and set of definitions. Rather than continuing the frustrating efforts 
to draft a single set of “waters of the United States” regulations that serve both 
regulatory programs, water quality would benefit tremendously from a complete 
separation of the two programs. The Supreme Court may have created enough of 
an interpretive loophole that would allow the EPA and Army Corps to achieve this 
separation themselves,408 but a congressional amendment would be cleaner and less 
susceptible to ongoing litigation. As a bonus, clear separation of the two permit 
programs could also prove a boon to building political momentum to finally extend 
the Clean Water Act to the NPDES-like water pollution that agricultural creates—
return flows from irrigation and channelized agricultural stormwater, long exempt 
from regulation409—without even the hint of a threat to farmers’ day-to-day 
activities, which has formed the basis of the American Farm Bureau’s strong (if not 





Protecting ourselves from ourselves is one of the trickiest purposes of public 
law. Nevertheless, in numerous contexts, generational amnesia has allowed the 
public, courts, regulatory agencies, politicians, and legislatures to embrace the 
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, allowing history to repeat itself. 
If one accepts that the shifting baseline syndrome is a real phenomenon with 
real consequences that generally impoverish society as a whole—whether through 
a degraded natural resource base, loss of global economic stability, or increased 
threats to public health—the question then becomes how to prevent, or at least 
correct for, its emergence. The loss of intergeneration memory about historical 
ecological conditions—“environmental generational amnesia”411—may require 
active reconstruction of cultural memory through new sources of data and creative 
extrapolation. For the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, however, the cultural 
 
408 In a series of cases, the Court has held that identical language does not have to mean the same 
thing in different parts of a statute. E.g., Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 
561, 574-76 (2007).  
409 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
410 Clean Water Act, WOTUS, AMER. FARM BUREAU (viewed Feb. 23, 2021), 
https://www.fb.org/issues/regulatory-reform/clean-water-act/. 
411 Kahn, supra note 52, at 93-94. 
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memory is right there—embodied in the very regulatory regime whose success 
allows the syndrome to emerge. 
More information, in other words, is unlikely to be a necessary or effective 
corrective to the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome. Instead, the various 
regulatory gatekeepers—members of legislatures, agency personnel, presidents and 
governors, and judges—need institutional prods to remind them to remember and 
to value the cultural memory they retrieve. For constitutional and other reasons, 
these institutional prods will largely need to function as norms rather than as 
requirements. Nevertheless, institutional norms, once developed, can still be 
powerful. As one example, when FDR broke the two-term presidential norm that 
George Washington established, the result was a constitutional amendment to 
ensure that no President ever did it again.412 
The first step in correcting the regulatory shifting baseline syndrome is 
deceptively simple: A broad swath of society must identify regulatory regimes as 
memory institutions. When interest groups or even a large percentage of the 
population challenge a longstanding public regulatory regime as outdated and 
obstructionist, the first response should become: “Why does it exist in the first 
place? What problem might we resurrect if this regime goes away?” 
Again, the point is not that longstanding public regulatory regimes cannot 
outlive their usefulness; they most certainly can. The point, rather, is that 
legislatures and agencies created them for a reason—a reason that was worth the 
effort and expense of putting the new regime into place. Particularly when the 
industries and interest groups that propose dismantling the regime argue in favor of 
the private benefits that will result—more profit, greater property rights, even (in 
the right circumstances) greater individual freedom and states’ rights—a high 
threshold of skepticism and a presumption in favor of continuing to protect the 
general public welfare is warranted.  
The second step is to reconstitute the full risk-benefit balancing at issue. At 
the very least, regulatory gatekeepers should understand the full range of societal 
problems at stake before they attempt to re-evaluate the regulatory regime for 
contemporary circumstances. The temptation in light of immediate political 
pressure is to discount the vanquished regulatory problem as irrelevant—to shift 
the regulatory baseline. Therefore, to ensure that this impulse is not in fact the 
regulatory shifting baseline syndrome, legislatures and courts should assess the 
extent to which the public is still benefitting from the regulatory regime—even if 
the problem itself has not been seen for decades. Will certain states create 
discriminatory voting regimes in the absence of federal oversight? Both historical 
and contemporary evidence clearly indicate that they will. Will the economy crash 
again if we let the financial industries do what they want? All available evidence 
says yes. Will infectious diseases return to the United States if we stop vaccinating 
and allow herd immunity to lapse? Again, with the exception of completely or 
geographically eradicated diseases like smallpox and polio, all available evidence 
 
412 U.S. Const., amend. 22 (passed by Congress March 21, 1947, ratified Feb. 27, 1951). 
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says yes. Will industries protect waterways in the absence of effective regulation? 
History says no. 
We should listen to history. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3793991
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